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 Tiered Constitutional Design
Rosalind Dixon* and David Landau**
ABSTRACT
Scholarship has posited two models of constitutionalism. One is short,
abstract, and rigid, like the United States Constitution. The other is lengthy,
detailed, and flexible, like the constitutions found in many U.S. states and in
many other countries around the world. This Article argues that there is a
descriptively common and normatively attractive third model: tiered constitu-
tional design. A tiered design aims to combine the virtues of rigidity and flexi-
bility by creating different rules of constitutional amendment for different
parts of the constitution. Most provisions are made fairly easy to change, but
certain articles or principles are given higher levels of entrenchment. A tiered
design can potentially preserve space for needed updates to the constitutional
text, a virtue of flexible design, while also providing stability for the core of the
constitution and protection against antidemocratic forms of constitutional
change, a benefit of rigid forms of constitutionalism as demonstrated by Arti-
cle V of the U.S. Constitution. Drawing on numerous examples of tiered de-
signs including U.S. states like California and countries as diverse as Canada,
Ecuador, India, and Ghana, this Article offers a critical analysis of the archi-
tecture of tiered designs and explores how they work in practice. While finding
unsurprisingly that enforcement is often imperfect, this Article concludes that
judicial and popular enforcement of tiered designs does show promise in help-
ing to combat the wave of antidemocratic constitutional projects that is threat-
ening to engulf much of the world.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent events across much of the world have raised fresh ques-
tions about the fragility of democratic constitutionalism, not only in
the global south but also in countries long thought immune to demo-
cratic backsliding. Intellectuals fear that countries in North America
and Western Europe might be susceptible to the same forces that have
recently undermined democracy in parts of Latin America and East-
ern Europe.1 Academic work has highlighted the myriad ways in
which political actors can carry out projects that will perpetuate their
1 See, e.g., Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy,
VOX (Feb. 21, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/2/21/14664568/lose-
constitutional-democracy-autocracy-trump-authoritarian [https://perma.cc/H5TJ-TH65].
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own power and weaken institutions designed to check it.2 Because for-
mal constitutional amendment or replacement has played a role in
many of these experiences, scholarship has focused in large part on
the design of these tools.
Scholars contrast two broad models of constitutionalism.3 The
first is short, abstract, and rigid, like the United States Constitution.
The second is longer, more detailed, and flexible, like the constitu-
tions found in much of the rest of the world and in most U.S. states. In
protecting against abusive use of the formal tools of constitutional
change to erode democracy, it would seem that the rigid model would
have great advantages because it inhibits use of constitutional amend-
ment mechanisms by short-term majorities without near-consensus
support. Article V of the U.S. Constitution, for example, is thought by
some scholars to make the U.S. Constitution one of the most difficult
in the world to amend.4 Aziz Huq suggests that the high degree of
entrenchment created by Article V played a key role in promoting the
Constitution’s survival during the early decades of the Republic,5
while others have praised it for ensuring a high degree of constitu-
tional stability thereafter.6
At the same time, the rigid model of constitutionalism found in
the U.S. Constitution has significant drawbacks that have seemingly
led most other countries to eschew the model.7 Rigid constitutionalism
2 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2007);
David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189 (2013); Ozan O. Varol,
Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1673 (2015).
3 See, e.g., ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009); Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Ex-
ceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641 (2014) [hereinafter Versteeg & Zackin, American
Constitutional Exceptionalism]; Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched: To-
ward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657 (2016) [herein-
after Versteeg & Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched].
4 See Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643,
645–46 (2011); Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter
at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, 13 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 686, 686 (2015); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362 (1994).
5 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2014).
6 See, e.g., LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES 164 (2004); Jos. R. Long,
Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573, 581, 587 (1915).
7 A number of scholars have criticized Article V for the extent of the “dead hand” prob-
lem it creates. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 165 (2006); Dixon,
supra note 4, at 655; Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is . . . Article V, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
171, 173 (1995); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitu-
tion, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1730 (2010); Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 609 (2008).
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may inhibit current majorities from carrying out needed updates of
the constitutional text; it may also prevent democratic forces from
gaining input into constitutionalism.8 In the United States, experience
suggests ways around these problems by empowering judges and poli-
ticians to carry out constitutional changes without formal amend-
ment.9 But in newer democracies, rigid constitutionalism may lead
politicians to attack judges in order to get favorable rulings; it may
also lead them to scrap their existing constitutions altogether because
of frustration with the existing text.10 Where constitutions are very
long and detailed, as is the case in most of the world and in most U.S.
states, rigidity may make it intolerably difficult to pass even technical
corrections to the constitutional text. Scholars have argued that this
has led most other jurisdictions to opt for flexible tools of constitu-
tional change, despite this leaving those countries open to the destabi-
lizing and antidemocratic effect of easy constitutional amendment.11
This Article argues that there is a third way. In fact, it is a com-
mon but underappreciated constitutional design. Constitutional de-
signers can and do seek to combine the virtues of flexible and rigid
constitutionalism in a model that we call tiered constitutional design.
Under tiered constitutionalism, the default rule of constitutional
amendment is a flexible one. However, certain provisions of the con-
stitution or forms of change are placed on a higher tier and thus made
more difficult to change. Theoretically, tiering can combine the best of
both forms of constitutionalism. Because most provisions can be
changed easily, the constitution can be updated as needs arise. At the
same time, enhanced protection of a core set of provisions may help
defend against particularly destabilizing forms of constitutional
change.
Article V of the U.S. Constitution surprisingly contains a germ of
this idea. It gives special protection to the provision giving equal rep-
8 See Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective, in
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96, 97–98 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011).
9 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (paperback ed. 1993)
(exploring change in United States history through “constitutional moments” that sometimes do
and sometimes do not include amendments to the formal constitutional text).
10 See ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 3, at 101 (arguing that overly rigid
amendment rules can incentivize constitutional replacement); Stephen Gardbaum, Are Strong
Constitutional Courts Always a Good Thing for New Democracies?, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 285, 307 (2015) (noting that inability to overrule constitutional decisions can lead politicians in
new democracies to pressure constitutional courts).
11 See Versteeg & Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched, supra note 3, at 659 (finding that
most comparative constitutions and constitutions in U.S. states are both far longer and far more
flexible than the U.S. Constitution).
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resentation to each state in the Senate. This provision can only be
changed with the approval of each state that would have its represen-
tation reduced.12 Around the world and in the U.S. states, however,
the idea of tiering is much more developed and sophisticated. Consti-
tutions use several different techniques to achieve a tiered design.
Some contain “eternity clauses,” making certain provisions impossible
to change. Others include several procedures for constitutional change
and state, or imply, that the more demanding path must be used for
changes affecting certain constitutional provisions or principles. Con-
stitutions use a number of procedural devices—including higher
supermajorities and additional procedural requirements like referen-
dums—to make constitutional change on this higher tier more diffi-
cult. This Article brings together evidence and practice of tiering from
many constitutions, including from U.S. states like California and na-
tional constitutions from countries as diverse as Canada, India, Ecua-
dor, and Ghana.
Little scholarship has focused on tiered amendment procedure,
and the limited work to treat the subject has viewed it primarily as a
tool of “expressive constitutionalism,” a means by which a democratic
polity may express its most fundamental values in the text of a written
constitution.13 While not discounting this function, this Article empha-
sizes tiering’s practical purpose in accommodating the competing ad-
vantages of flexibility and rigidity in constitutional amendment design.
In other words, a tiered constitutional design not only plays an expres-
sive purpose; it is also meant to be used in order to defend democracy
and protect against certain destabilizing forms of constitutional
change. This point highlights a number of ways in which many tiered
amendment clauses found in comparative constitutional law may fall
short in practice—they may be either overinclusive or underinclusive
from the standpoint of protecting basic democratic institutions, they
may be written in ways that make it easy for would-be autocrats to
evade them, or the procedural requirements of higher tiers might be
insufficient to actually deter destabilizing forms of change.
12 U.S. CONST. art. V; see, e.g., FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP
THE SENATE: THE UNEQUAL CONSEQUENCES OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 1 (1999); Huq, supra
note 5, at 1173.
13 See, e.g., Richard Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663 (2010) [herein-
after Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs]; Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of Constitu-
tional Amendment Rules, 59 MCGILL L.J. 225 (2013) [hereinafter Albert, Expressive Function];
Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
913 (2014) [hereinafter Albert, Structure]; Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality
and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251 (1996).
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Tiered amendment procedures are an important special case of a
more general phenomenon. They represent one way in which constitu-
tions can form hybrids between the lengthy, detailed, and flexible
model of constitutionalism and the rigid framework model. Other ap-
proaches include mixing abstract and more specific constitutional lan-
guage or creating systems whereby some but not all constitutional
provisions may be suspended or subject to legislative override.14 This
Article does not explore these other modes of tiering in any detail,
save to note the relationship between tiered approaches to language
and formal amendment: often in a tiered constitution, provisions that
enjoy a high degree of formal entrenchment will also tend to be more
abstract and general, while more flexible provisions will also be more
detailed.
The rest of this Article is organized as follows. Part I briefly gives
examples of tiered constitutional designs in order to demonstrate that
these designs are ubiquitous and to provide a sense of their structure.
Parts II and III explain the virtues of flexible and rigid constitutional
designs, respectively, arguing that each form of constitutional amend-
ment rule has both significant advantages and disadvantages. Part IV
suggests that an attractive solution to this dilemma, theoretically far
better than simply choosing an average level of amendment difficulty,
is a tiered constitutional design. Part V considers in detail the archi-
tecture of these clauses, highlighting and offering insight into a range
of questions faced by constitutional designers. These questions include
which provisions to place on the higher tier, whether to protect this
tier through more rule-like or standard-like language, whether to rely
on constitutional designers ex ante or judges ex post to define the
tiers, how many tiers to have, and which procedures should be used to
protect constitutional change on the higher tiers. Part VI considers
experiences with actually enforcing these clauses against destabilizing
or antidemocratic forms of change. These experiences suggest that en-
forcement is extremely challenging—especially under common condi-
tions of democratic fragility—but not impossible and that popular
forms of enforcement by civil society and political actors may play a
key role in addition to enforcement by the courts. The Article con-
cludes by arguing that although there is a large gap between ideal the-
ories of constitutional design and the real-world challenges of
constitutional drafting in this area, tiered designs do show promise in
14 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 33 (U.K.).
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acting as a speed bump or deterrent against destabilizing or an-
tidemocratic forms of constitutional change.
I. THE UBIQUITY OF TIERED CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS
The tiering of constitutional amendment rules is a common fea-
ture of constitutional design in many countries around the world.
Even the U.S. Constitution provides some version of constitutional
tiering. Article V of the U.S. Constitution explicitly creates a multi-
track approach to formal constitutional amendment. For most provi-
sions, it requires that amendments obtain the support of two-thirds of
both houses of Congress (or state conventions) and then three-
quarters of state legislatures.15 But as already noted, an amendment to
the Equal Suffrage Clause of the Constitution, giving every state two
Senators, effectively requires the consent of every state.16 Addition-
ally, prior to 1808, Article V also prevented any amendment to certain
provisions regarding slavery.17
Some scholars, including Akhil Amar, suggest further that Article
V creates an implied form of tiering; by setting out the requirements
for constitutional amendment by representative actors, the text of Ar-
ticle V does not exclude the possibility of formal constitutional change
by the people by way of some more direct “majoritarian and populist
mechanism” akin to a national referendum.18 Other proponents of a
nonexclusive view of Article V, such as Bruce Ackerman, could
equally be understood to argue that the United States adopts a tiered
approach to constitutional change: one track governed by Article V,
and another, more informal track governed by the requirements of
heightened public deliberation and sustained popular participation.19
At the state level, a number of constitutions create a more ex-
plicit form of multitrack approach towards formal constitutional
change. Many state constitutions, for example, create a distinction be-
tween a constitutional “amendment” and a constitutional “revision,”
with the latter representing a more fundamental form of constitutional
change.20 A leading example is the state constitution of California.21
15 U.S. CONST. art. V.
16 See id.
17 Id.
18 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 295 (2005) [hereinafter AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 457, 459 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Con-
sent of the Governed].
19 See ACKERMAN, supra note 9.
20 See Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in 3 STATE CONSTITU-
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An amendment may be placed on the ballot by either a two-thirds
vote in the California state legislature or signatures equal to eight per-
cent of the votes cast in the last gubernatorial election, while a revi-
sion requires the approval of two-thirds of the legislature to be placed
on the ballot.22 In other words, in California, the major significance of
the amendment/revision distinction is that an amendment can be car-
ried out through popular initiative bypassing the state legislature en-
tirely, but a revision may not be since it requires a prior vote of the
state legislature.
When one reads the U.S. Constitution together with the state
constitutions as a single system, the United States is arguably home to
another form of tiering. At the state level, the requirements for formal
constitutional amendment vary from highly flexible to only moder-
ately difficult—most constitutions impose either an ordinary majority
requirement or a relatively weak supermajority requirement (such as
sixty percent, two-thirds, or seventy percent) for the legislative pas-
sage of proposed amendments.23 For constitutional rights in particular,
where the U.S. Constitution creates a floor but not a ceiling, these
dynamics create something like a tiered design.24 Changes to state
constitutional standards can be made through relatively undemanding
processes, but those that seek to alter the “core” federal floor must
meet the demanding standards of Article V.
Take the right to equality, or equal protection of the laws. The
flexibility of state constitutions has allowed state legislatures and pop-
ular movements broad freedom to redefine the scope and content of
TIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 177, 178 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006)
(finding the distinction to be specifically referenced in twenty-three state constitutions).
21 See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII.
22 See JOSEPH R. GRODIN, DARIEN SHANSKE & MICHAEL B. SALERNO, THE CALIFORNIA
STATE CONSTITUTION 467 (2d ed. 2016); Ernest L. Graves, The Guarantee Clause in California:
State Constitutional Limits on Initiatives Changing the California Constitution, 31 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1305, 1316 (1998); Ray L. Ngo, The Elephant in the Room: A Critique of California’s Con-
stitutional Amendment Process That Gave Birth to the Baby Elephant (Proposition 8) and a Call
for Its Reform, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 235, 240 (2011); Jeremy Zeitlin, Whose Constitution Is It
Anyway? The Executives’ Discretion to Defend Initiatives Amending the California Constitution,
39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 327, 334 (2011).
23 See Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denomi-
nator Problem, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 195, 199–201 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 1st
paperback ed. 2014); John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitu-
tions, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 501, 521–26 (1997).
24 This point, for example, was at the core of Justice Brennan’s argument that state courts
should adopt expansive interpretations of state constitutional rights in the face of retrenchment
in rights interpretation at the federal constitutional level. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Con-
stitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
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commitments to equality in a variety of contexts, including, most nota-
bly, in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights. In recent years, a
variety of state legislatures and other actors have adopted or proposed
amendments seeking to prohibit the recognition of same-sex mar-
riage.25 However, in Obergefell v. Hodges,26 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that state constitutional amendments seeking to limit recognition
of same-sex relationships were invalid because they failed to provide
equal protection of the law.27 Before same-sex marriage was a federal
constitutional right, it was part of the lower tier of constitutional is-
sues that could be dealt with through the flexible procedures found in
state constitutions.28 But after the Court constitutionalized the issue, it
placed it on a higher, “core” tier and in effect held that changes (ab-
sent Supreme Court reinterpretation) would require a federal amend-
ment using the procedures found in Article V.
A large number of constitutions worldwide adopt a tiered ap-
proach of this kind to formal constitutional change. The Canadian
Constitution Act of 1982,29 for example, creates five tiers of entrench-
ment.30 The default amendment procedure requires resolutions from
the House of Commons and the Senate, as well as the approval of
two-thirds of the provinces (aggregately representing at least half of
the total national population).31 The second amendment procedure,
which requires agreement of both houses of Parliament as well as all
provincial legislatures, applies to five broad topics that are specially
protected: the monarchy and its representation in Canada, provincial
representation in the House of Commons, the use of English and
French, the composition of the Supreme Court, and the formal
amendment procedures.32 The third procedure requires resolutions
from both houses of Parliament and from the legislature of any af-
fected provinces for amendments applying to some but not all prov-
inces, including the alteration of boundaries between provinces or the
25 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional Inevitability of Same-Sex
Marriage, 71 MD. L. REV. 471, 472 n.7 (2012).
26 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
27 Id. For a discussion on the issue of how far Oberfegell goes in depriving these amend-
ments of effect beyond the question of formal same-sex marriage recognition, see Mark P.
Strasser, The Right to Marry and State Marriage Amendments: Implications for Future Families,
45 STETSON L. REV. 309 (2016).
28 See, e.g., Tribe & Matz, supra note 25.
29 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 38(1) (U.K.).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. art. 41.
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use of English or French within a province.33 The fourth procedure
authorizes the national Parliament to formally amend the Constitu-
tion by passing a law, but it applies only to matters relating to the
executive government or the houses of Parliament and excludes ques-
tions concerning executive government and the national legislature
that are expressly keyed to higher amendment thresholds.34 The fifth
procedure authorizes provincial legislatures to formally amend their
own constitutions by passing a law and applies to all provincial mat-
ters except those specifically assigned higher amendment thresholds.35
In India, most amendments to the Constitution require the sup-
port of a majority of all members and a two-thirds supermajority of
those members “present and voting” in both houses of Parliament.36
However, the Constitution also establishes an additional requirement
of ratification by a majority of state legislatures for amendments af-
fecting representation of the states in Parliament and provisions con-
cerning the election of the President, executive and legislative power,
the union judiciary, high courts in union territories and the states, and
the lists of federal, state, and concurrent responsibilities found in the
Constitution’s Seventh Schedule.37 As explained in more detail below,
the Indian Supreme Court in effect created an additional judge-made
tier through its “basic structure” doctrine through which certain fun-
damental constitutional changes cannot be carried out through any
formal process of constitutional change, at least short of wholesale
constitutional replacement.38
In Africa, the Ghanaian Constitution has a two-tier hierarchy
that establishes a very high threshold of agreement for amending cer-
tain provisions, including the Constitution’s protections for fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms; changes to these articles require a proposal in
Parliament and consultation with the Council of State, followed by a
referendum with at least forty percent popular participation and
three-quarters of voters approving, ratification by Parliament, and as-
sent from the President.39 By contrast, the amendment of all other
33 Id. art. 43.
34 Id. art. 44.
35 Id. art. 45.
36 See INDIA CONST. art. 368, § 2.
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Bharati v. Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 406, 797 (India) (deriving the concept that
constitutional amendments may not violate certain fundamental principles of the constitutional
order).
39 See GHANA CONST. art. 290 (referring to these specially protected provisions as “en-
trenched provisions”).
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provisions does not require a popular vote but instead merely a pro-
posal in Parliament, consultation with the Council of State, two suc-
cessive votes of two-thirds approval in Parliament, and the President’s
assent.40 The Nigerian Constitution has a similar two-tier hierarchy.
At the higher threshold—applying to provisions concerning funda-
mental rights, the creation of new subnational units, adjustments to
territorial boundaries, and the formal amendment rules—a formal
amendment requires four-fifths approval in both houses of the na-
tional legislature, as well as two-thirds approval from all subnational
legislatures.41 At the lower threshold, which applies to other provi-
sions, amendment requires two-thirds approval in both houses of the
national legislature and two-thirds approval among subnational
legislatures.42
In Latin America, Ecuador and other Andean countries, includ-
ing Venezuela and Bolivia, are interesting examples of multitrack con-
stitutional designs that identify tiers primarily with standard-like
language denoting the effect of a given change, rather than through
identification of particular parts or provisions of the constitution. In
Ecuador, the default procedure of constitutional amendment can be
carried out either by a referendum or by passage by two-thirds of the
National Assembly.43 However, the more demanding route of a “par-
tial” reform must be used to “alter the fundamental structure or the
nature and constituent elements of the State”;44 this route requires a
referendum in addition to passage by a majority of the Congress.45
Finally, the most demanding route of a constituent assembly must be
used if changes constitute a restriction “on constitutional rights and
guarantees or chang[e] the procedure for amending the Constitu-
tion.”46 Venezuela has a similar three-track design,47 while Bolivia has
a two-track system that distinguishes a “total reform” by constituent
40 Id. art. 291.
41 See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 9(3).
42 See id. § 9(2).
43 See CONSTITUCIO´N DE LA REPU´BLICA DEL ECUADOR [ECUADOR CONST.] 2008, art. 441,
translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., Maria del Carmen
Gress & J.J. Ruchti trans., HeinOnline 2016).
44 Id. arts. 441–442.
45 Id. art. 442.
46 Id. arts. 441–442, 444. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court is given the authority and
duty to rule on which procedural route is appropriate in any given case. Id. art. 443.
47 See CONSTITUCIO´N DE LA REPU´BLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [VENEZUELA
CONST.] 1999, arts. 340–349, translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay
Ruchti ed., Ministry of Commc’n & Info. of Venez. & Jefri J. Ruchti trans., HeinOnline 2010)
(distinguishing between amendment, constitutional reform, and a constituent assembly).
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assembly from a “partial reform” that cannot be used to “affect[ the
Constitution’s] fundamental premises, affect[] rights, duties and guar-
antees, or the supremacy and reform of the Constitution.”48
While the foregoing examples involve constitutions that lay out
distinct tracks of constitutional reform, many constitutions around the
world also contain express “eternity clauses” that purport to render
certain provisions of the constitution impossible to amend.49 These in-
clude, for example, the relationship between church and state,50 a
given set of territorial boundaries,51 term limits,52 or other basic values
of the state.53 The remainder of this Article refers to many other ex-
amples drawn from comparative constitutionalism in order to illus-
trate the architecture and functioning of different models of tiered
designs. However, these examples should be sufficient to show that
tiered constitutionalism is an important aspect of constitutional de-
sign. The next few Parts aim to show how tiered constitutionalism
48 See CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DEL ESTADO [CONSTITUTION] 2009, art. 411 (Bol.), trans-
lated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., Embassy of Bol., Wash.,
D.C. trans., HeinOnline 2011).
49 For an overview of the concept of an eternity clause, see Albert, Constitutional Hand-
cuffs, supra note 13, at 678–85.
50 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMORATIQUE ET POPU-
LAIRE 1989, art. 212 (Alg.), translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti
ed., Maria del Carmen Gress & J.J. Ruchti trans., HeinOnline 2016) (amendment may not alter
“Islam, as the religion of the state”); QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1980 art. 177 (same); CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUB-
LIQUE DU BENIN 1990, art. 156, translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay
Ruchti ed., Jefri J. Ruchti trans., HeinOnline 2011) (protecting “secularity” of the State); CON-
STITUTION DU BURUNDI 2005, art. 299 (same); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN
1994, art. 100 (same); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 1982, art. 4 (same); CON-
STITUIC¸A˜O DA REPU´BLICA PORTUGUESA [PORTUGAL CONST.], 7th rev., 2005, art. 288(c) (separa-
tion between church and state unalterable).
51 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE 4TH REPUBLIC 1991, art. 165 (Burk. Faso); CONSTITU-
TION DE L’UNION DES COMOROS [COMOROS CONST.] 2001, art. 42; CONSTITUTION OF THE RE-
PUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI 1992, art. 92; FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL
GUINEA 1982, art. 134; CONSTITUTION OF THE 4TH REPUBLIC 2010, art. 163 (Madag.).
52 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC [C.A.R.] 2016, art. 153;
CONSTITUTION OF EL SALVADOR 1983, art. 248; CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
MAURITANIA 1991, art. 99.
53 See, e.g., CONSTITUIC¸A˜O FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 60(4) (Braz.), translated
in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., Keith S. Rosenn trans. & ann.,
HeinOnline 2017) (“No proposed constitutional amendment shall be considered that is aimed at
abolishing the following: the federalist form of the National Government; direct, secret, univer-
sal and periodic suffrage; separation of powers; individual rights and guarantees.”) (subdivision
designations omitted); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 79(3) (Ger.), translation at http://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/2VRN-UN9A] (prohibiting
amendments dealing with the federal nature of the state or certain basic principles including
human dignity).
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might respond to the competing benefits and drawbacks of fully flexi-
ble and fully rigid systems of constitutional change.
II. THE VIRTUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL FLEXIBILITY
The formal rules governing processes of constitutional amend-
ment are deeply important in any constitutional system: in
nondemocracies, they can often affect the scope for civil society to
pursue incremental forms of legal and political change or for authori-
tarian governments to adopt legal and political changes that advance
their own interests. Formal amendment procedures, however, argua-
bly play a particularly important role in guaranteeing the legitimacy of
a democratic constitution. Constitutional systems that are fairly flexi-
ble in allowing formal constitutional change create several advantages.
A. Updating Constitutional Texts
If democratic constitutions do not provide mechanisms for their
alteration, they suffer from an obvious internal legitimacy problem.
They impose restraints on the actions of current democratic majori-
ties, in the name of past majorities, without any mechanism by which
current majorities may “consent” to constraints of this kind.54 Without
some form of mechanism for constitutional change, it will also be im-
possible to tell whether a lack of change is in fact a product of current
support for constitutional requirements or instead the product of the
legal impossibility of change. Without the possibility of constitutional
change, therefore, any democratic constitution will suffer from a seri-
ous form of the “dead hand” problem, or the problem of ongoing
democratic legitimacy.55
This Article does not of course suggest that the need for constitu-
tional updating is equivalent across all types of constitutions. Where
texts are longer and more detailed and specific, for example, it may be
that more frequent changes need to be made because such provisions
may be more likely to become outdated and also more difficult to
change through other informal means, such as judicial interpretation.56
Simply, all constitutions will require updating to some degree over
time. Further, since most constitutions are now fairly long and de-
54 See, e.g., Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 18.
55 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1119, 1120–23 (1998); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (1998); Lawrence G. Sager, The Dead Hand and Constitutional
Amendment, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 275, 276 (1996); Samaha, supra note 7, at 618.
56 See Dixon, supra note 8, at 106 (explaining a correlation between the length of a consti-
tution and its frequency of amendment).
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tailed, the importance of updating may be high with respect to these
constitutions.57
Of course, formal processes of constitutional amendment are not
the only means by which constitutional change may occur.58 Constitu-
tional change can also occur informally, for example, through execu-
tive, legislative, or judicial interpretation. This Article highlights some
of those mechanisms here, while also pointing out that they are often
imperfect substitutes for formal constitutional change.
A significant strain of literature in the United States has focused
on courts as a locus of these “informal” methods of constitutional
change. Courts, as David Strauss notes, can engage in “dynamic” ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation, which means that constitu-
tional norms are often effectively updated simply via a process of
constitutional construction, or common law–style incremental
change.59 Strauss argues that this form of common law–style change
means that in the United States, formal processes of constitutional
amendment are more or less irrelevant; if courts adopt a common
law–based approach to constitutional interpretation, Strauss argues,
formal changes to the text of a constitution will be neither necessary
nor sufficient to ensure the updating of constitutional meaning in line
with changing social circumstances and understandings.60
A leading example which Strauss gives in support of this thesis
involves the history of the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) in the
United States and the progressive interpretation by the Court of the
Equal Protection Clause to require “an exceedingly persuasive justifi-
cation” for all classifications based on sex.61 This approach has led the
Court to strike down almost all those classifications based on sex that
equal rights feminists were targeting. On this basis, Strauss argues that
57 See Versteeg & Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism, supra note 3, at 1658
fig.3 (finding sharp increases in the average length of both world and U.S. state constitutions
over time).
58 See Dixon, supra note 8, at 99–100.
59 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 888–900, 905–06, 935 (1996); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITU-
TION 1, 20 (2d ed. 2013).
60 See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457, 1458–59, 1462–63 (2001) (arguing that the U.S. constitutional “system would look the
same today if Article V of the Constitution had never been adopted and the Constitution con-
tained no provision for formal amendment”). For the limits to the Straussian thesis as applied to
more concrete, specific constitutional “rules,” see Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional
Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 336–38.
61 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (quoting Personnel Adm’r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
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“it is difficult to identify any respect in which constitutional law is dif-
ferent from what it would have been if the ERA had been adopted.”62
The difference between formal and informal approaches to constitu-
tional change in this context, therefore, may simply have been one of
timing—formal amendment through the ERA would have constituted
a more rapid route for achieving change that eventually occurred
anyway.63
Of course, courts are far from the only informal method of consti-
tutional change. Other branches of government, as well as citizens,
may also be engaged in these processes. Bruce Ackerman, for in-
stance, has argued that across the course of U.S. history there have in
fact been a series of “constitutional moments” in which both legisla-
tors and citizens have been engaged in a process of informal constitu-
tional change: the New Deal, the Civil Rights Acts, and, arguably,
post-1989 changes to the constitutional order, such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement.64 Legislatures at times have also en-
gaged in forms of constitutional updating via the adoption of statutes
that come to have quasi-constitutional or “super-statute” status.65 Fi-
nally, as Keith Whittington has pointed out, throughout U.S. history
the three branches of government have engaged in processes of “con-
stitutional construction,” where their interactions have created and
62 Strauss, supra note 60, at 1476–77.
63 The ERA was passed by Congress and sent to the states for ratification in 1972 but
narrowly failed to gain the necessary degree of state support for ratification within the ten-year
period set by Congress. From the 1970s onwards, the Supreme Court slowly but steadily in-
creased the level of scrutiny it applied to sex-based classifications. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76 (1971), the year before the ERA was sent to the states for ratification, the Court applied a
heightened version of rational basis review to invalidate a state law giving preference to a male
administrator of an estate. Id. at 76. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the Court
held that “close judicial scrutiny” should be applied to classifications based on sex and relied on
this to invalidate a federal law distinguishing between male and female military personnel for the
purposes of the eligibility of their spouse to a dependency allowance. Id. at 682. In Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court relied on the same standard to invalidate a state law
prohibiting the sale of certain types of alcohol to men under twenty-one, when women over
eighteen were permitted to purchase it. Id. at 197–99. In 1982, in Mississippi University for Wo-
men v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), the Court struck down a state law prohibiting men from
being admitted to a state school nursing program, id. at 733; and in 1996, the Court endorsed a
standard of “exceedingly persuasive justification” of classifications based on sex and applied it to
invalidate a state law prohibiting women from being admitted to a previously all-male state
college, which relied on a military-style, “adversative” method of instruction, see Virginia, 518
U.S. at 522, 524.
64 See ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 40–41; Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1756–57 (2007).
65 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1216–17 (2001).
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changed the meaning of concepts that are ambiguous or left open in
the constitutional text, such as the standard for impeachment of exec-
utive or judicial officials.66
In many contexts, these informal methods of updating are imper-
fect substitutes for formal methods of constitutional change. Differ-
ences in legal or political cultures may affect the ability or willingness
of different actors to engage in informal updating. Various scholars,
for example, have argued that courts in the United States have been
particularly interested in engaging in judicial updating.67 It may be
that in countries with more formal legal traditions, or which place a
higher premium on judicial restraint, courts may be less able to en-
gage in processes of informal constitutional change. Similarly, jus-
ticiability doctrines may limit a court’s ability to even engage with an
area where constitutional change is needed. In other words, there may
well be circumstances in which formal routes of constitutional change
are blocked, but informal mechanisms are not adequate substitutes.
In addition, informal methods of change are more likely to work
for constitutional provisions that are standard-like rather than rule-
like in their nature. In general, the more rule-like—and consequently
clear—a given constitutional provision is, the harder it will be for ac-
tors to find informal ways to reinterpret it.68 The text of the constitu-
tion may itself be sufficiently clear that even scholars and judges who
generally endorse a dynamic or “living” approach to constitutional in-
terpretation would suggest that a court cannot legitimately interpret
relevant constitutional language so as to achieve an outcome more in
line with current social needs and expectations.
Provisions involving numbers often provide a good example of
this kind of rule-like provision and the difficulties involved in updat-
ing it. In the United States, for instance, the Constitution contains a
number of specific numerical rules: a rule that each state is entitled to
two Senators,69 a requirement that each congressional district contain
at least 30,000 voters,70 clauses prescribing minimum age qualifications
for the House, Senate, and presidency,71 and a clause prescribing a
right to trial by jury in all cases where the amount in controversy ex-
66 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 17–19 (1st paperback
ed. 2001).
67 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 60.
68 See Dixon, supra note 60.
69 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1.
70 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
71 See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2–3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (establishing minimum age limits of twenty-
five, thirty, and thirty-five for the House, Senate, and presidency respectively).
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ceeds twenty dollars.72 Changing social circumstances have clearly af-
fected the degree to which rules of this kind fit current political
conditions. The Two Senators Rule, for instance, has led to the dilu-
tion of voting power for racial minorities in ways that have arguably
made the Senate increasingly out of sync with evolving commitments
to racial equality evidenced in the Reconstruction Amendments and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.73 For the Qualifications Clauses, the
relevant age requirements were formulated on the assumption of
much higher turnover in office due to lower life expectancy. And for
the Twenty Dollars Clause, the real value of twenty dollars from 1791
is now vastly higher due to inflation. Nobody seriously suggests, how-
ever, that these problems provide a basis for the Supreme Court to
engage in creative reinterpretation of these requirements.
The Court could, of course, interpret these requirements to better
reflect current conditions by reading them in a functional rather than
literal way.74 Instead of reading the word “two” to literally mean two,
it could thus read it as expressing a certain historically defined balance
between the representation of large and small states in which every
state is entitled to a minimum of two senators, but larger states such as
New York, California, and Texas are entitled to up to twelve senators,
based on population.75 Similarly, the Court could read the word
72 See id. amend. VII. Numerical provisions are not the only rule-like provisions in the
U.S. Constitution. A few examples include the clause preventing members of Congress from
holding any other office, see id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, the clause preventing the government from
granting titles of nobility, see id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8, and the clause requiring the president to be a
natural-born citizen, see id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
73 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). On the difference between descriptive and substantive represen-
tation, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF Representation 60–61 (1st paperback ed.
1972). For arguments about the unintended but clear racially disparate impact of the Two Sena-
tors Rule, see Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has
Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 21, 43–47 (1997); Neil Malhotra & Connor Raso, Racial Representation
and U.S. Senate Apportionment, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 1038, 1046 (2007) (suggesting that these effects
are “a classic example of [the] unintended consequences” of a rule-like constitutional provision).
74 See Dixon, supra note 60.
75 This would preserve the ratio between the population of the largest and smallest three
states at the founding (as measured by the 1790 census). In 1790, the three largest states (Vir-
ginia, Pennsylvania, North Carolina) had 43% of the national population, while the smallest
three (Delaware, Rhode Island, Georgia) had 6%. See RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF
PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1793), https://www.census
.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1790a.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQN7-YMQQ]. In 2010, by con-
trast, the three largest states (California, Texas, New York) had 26% of the national population,
while the three smallest (Wyoming, Vermont, North Dakota) had only 0.6%. See U.S. Census
2010: Interactive Population Map, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/2010census/pop
map/ [https://perma.cc/7UR6-U6SP] (follow “Total Population”).
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“thirty-five” in the Qualifications Clauses as effectively requiring a
much lower minimum age for office (based on the greater exposure of
potential candidates to formal education, and traditional and social
media debates about political issues) or conversely a much higher age,
which would ensure some form of effective term limit for members of
Congress and the Senate.76 And it could read “twenty dollars” to
mean a much higher amount, as adjusted for inflation.77
Almost all constitutional scholars agree, however, that it would
be illegitimate, or at least deeply problematic, for the Court to adopt
this kind of evolving approach to the relevant constitutional rules.
Some critical legal scholars note the possibility of the Court adopting
this kind of approach but do not to endorse it.78 Rather, they note the
possibility to show the pervasive indeterminacy in formal constitu-
tional language.79 Among liberal constitutionalists, even scholars who
generally suggest that almost all constitutional change can be achieved
via informal rather than formal means tend to reject the idea that the
Court should update requirements of this kind via a process of consti-
tutional interpretation.80 In this sense, formal procedures for constitu-
tional amendment may be essential to the ability of constitutional
drafters to include rule-like or specific provisions in a constitution.
And rule-like or specific provisions appear to be increasingly common
in modern constitutionalism.81
B. Overriding Judicial Decisions
Another important function of formal constitutional amendment
procedure is to provide a mechanism by which democratic majorities
76 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983)
(suggesting a figure based on the basis of “a minimum number of years after puberty”); Dixon,
supra note 60, at 333.
77 See Dixon, supra note 60, at 336.
78 See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1174
(1985); Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 683, 686–87 (1985) (arguing that the minimum age clause is “simply the framers’
shorthand for their more complex policies”).
79 See Peller, supra note 78; Tushnet, supra note 78.
80 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 305
(2007) (“When the text is relatively rule-like, concrete and specific, the underlying principles
[behind it] cannot override the textual command.”); Strauss, supra note 59, at 906 (“[N]o one
seriously suggests that the age limits specified in the Constitution for Presidents and members of
Congress should be interpreted to refer to other than chronological (earth) years . . . .” (empha-
sis added)).
81 See, e.g., Versteeg & Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism, supra note 3, at
1663–66 (presenting evidence that both U.S. state constitutions and most constitutions around
the world have a considerably higher level of detail than the U.S. Constitution).
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may override a court’s interpretation of existing constitutional lan-
guage. Part of the idea of an entrenched constitution is that it should
impose some set of constraints on current majority decisionmaking.
Constraints of this kind can help reduce the “transaction costs” of or-
dinary democratic politics,82 allow for meaningful deliberation within
a polity,83 and ensure some degree of protection for minority rights.84
But democratic theorists also increasingly emphasize the idea that de-
mocracy entails scope for actual participation by citizens in demo-
cratic processes.
Democracy, as Justice Stephen Breyer noted, is premised on an
idea of active self-government by citizens, or “liberty of the ancients”
as well as “liberty of the moderns.”85 “[L]iberty of the ancients,” as
Benjamin Constant noted in defining the two broad forms of liberty,
also involves “an active and constant participation in collective
power”;86 to use Justice Breyer’s language, “the people themselves
should participate in government—though their participation may
vary in degree.”87 Participation of this kind, Jeremy Waldron has ar-
gued, extends to constitutional as well as ordinary politics; in a democ-
racy, Waldron argued, there is broad scope for reasonable
disagreement among citizens as to the scope of constitutional require-
ments.88 There may be broad consensus among reasonable citizens as
to the need to recognize minimum rights to “free speech and freedom
of association,” which establish the basic “deliberative context . . . for
formal political decision-making.”89 But beyond that, the idea of indi-
viduals as self-governing actors in a democracy implies a commitment
to participation—and more specifically, majority-based decisionmak-
ing—in the resolution of constitutional as well as more ordinary politi-
cal disagreements.90
Some constitutions contain special mechanisms for the expression
of disagreement of this kind by providing for the legislative override
of court decisions without reliance on processes of constitutional
amendment. In Canada, for instance, the Constitution Act can only be
82 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 6–7 (1962).
83 Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dimensions of Democracy, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1723
(2003).
84 Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at x (1977).
85 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 3–4 (2005) (quoting Benjamin Constant).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 15.
88 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 278–81 (1999).
89 Id. at 283.
90 See id. at 243, 282–85.
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amended by quite onerous procedures, but Section 33 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that most of the rights pro-
visions contained in the Charter can be overridden by ordinary legisla-
tive vote on a five-year renewable basis.91 Similar powers of formal
legislative override are also found in Poland, Mongolia, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, and Finland—and in a range of countries with constitutions
that lack formally entrenched status.92
Similarly, some constitutions at least arguably give the legislature
power to alter the jurisdiction of particular courts. In the United
States, for instance, Article III of the Constitution gives Congress
power to make “exceptions” to the appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court.93 Some constitutional scholars suggest that this also pro-
vides a means by which Congress may attempt to override a decision
of the Supreme Court with which a majority strongly disagrees,94 al-
though others contest whether the courts would give effect to jurisdic-
tion-stripping legislation if it purported to strip jurisdiction from all
courts.95 The logic of how such a power operates is as follows: a court
renders a decision that a democratic majority finds unacceptable;
Congress responds by reenacting relevant legislation, or similar legis-
lation, or the executive responds by declining to implement a court
decision; and, at the same time (or subsequently), Congress passes leg-
islation formally ousting the jurisdiction of federal and state courts to
hear a challenge to the validity of this broad class of provisions. Con-
gress invoked this very logic in threatening to use its powers under
91 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 33, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.); JANET L. HIEBERT, CHARTER CON-
FLICTS 46, 62 (2002); Tsvi Kahana, The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion: Les-
sons from the Ignored Practice of Section 33 of the Charter, 44 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 255, 276 (2001).
92 See STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
5–6 (2013).
93 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (giving the Supreme Court “appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make”
over designated classes of cases).
94 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1041 (1982); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial
Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 929 (1982).
95 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Strip-
ping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1002, 1008, 1042 (2007); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L.
REV. 1043, 1045 (2010); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress
and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 34–36 (1990); Gerald Gunther, Congressional
Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36
STAN. L. REV. 895, 921–22 (1984); James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority,
and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 238
(2007).
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Article III to override decisions of the federal courts following Brown
v. Board of Education,96 which involved school desegregation, and va-
rious Supreme Court decisions protecting the civil liberties of commu-
nists and communist sympathizers.97 In India, the Lok Sabha (the
lower house of the Indian Parliament) has frequently relied on a simi-
lar power as a means of attempting to override courts’ decisions.98
In most countries with entrenched constitutions, however, there
is no formal power of legislative override or jurisdiction stripping of
this kind. Formal procedures for constitutional amendment are thus
the only formal mechanisms available to legislatures, or democratic
majorities, in seeking to override a decision of the court with which
they disagree. In the United States, Article V has played only a mini-
mal role of this kind in modern times. The formal threshold for
amendment is too high to provide much threat against even fairly un-
popular judicial decisions because relatively small minorities can
block the use of the formal amendment power. But in many other
countries, and indeed many U.S. states where amendment rules are
more flexible, formal amendment has been a central tool for the ex-
pression of legislative or popular disagreement with court decisions.99
Take the experience in India, where most amendments require
approval by a majority of all members of the Parliament and two-
thirds of those present and voting.100 Formal processes of constitu-
tional amendment became an important tool for the override of court
decisions in the first year of the 1950 Constitution’s operation. The
first such amendment (the First Amendment) was passed only one
year after the Constitution came into effect and sought to override
two important decisions of the Supreme Court of India (“SCI”) on the
96 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
97 See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
98 The technique has been to place legislation on a special constitutional schedule where
judicial review may not be taken. See, e.g., INDIA CONST., amended by Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955 (adopted in response to West Bengal v. Banerjee, (1954) SCR 558 (India)
and Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co., (1954) SCR 674 (India)); INDIA CONST.,
amended by Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 (adopted in response to Madras v.
Dorairajan, (1951) SCR 525 (India)); Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Drafting and Distrust, 13
INT’L J. CONST. L. 819, 836–37 (2015); Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India, 1 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 476, 485–86, 488 (2003).
99 See Dixon, supra note 8, at 98 (noting the importance of constitutional amendment in
“trumping existing judicial interpretations”); Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the
United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bath-
tub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 35 (1989); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24
WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 178–79 (1983).
100 See INDIA CONST. art. 368, cl. 2.
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right to freedom of expression and the scope for the state to make
certain “reservations” in public education or employment.101 The In-
dian Constitution was originally drafted so as to allow various restric-
tions on free speech, including laws relating to “libel, slander,
defamation, contempt of court,” or any other matter which offended
“decency or morality or which undermine[d] the security of, or
tend[ed] to overthrow, the State.”102 But in an early case, Thappar v.
Madras,103 the SCI read those limitations narrowly to permit only
those kinds of restrictions that had the sole purpose of protecting “the
security of the State” or preventing its overthrow and not regulations
that had more diverse purposes or were directed toward less serious,
more localized threats.104 This was met with significant opposition
from the Congress-led government, as well as various state govern-
ments, and proposals were made immediately to override the SCI’s
decision by constitutional amendment.105 The Lok Sabha had no diffi-
culty passing such an amendment.
The same basic dynamic applied to changes made by the First
Amendment in the ability of the state to make reservations in public
education based on caste and other forms of disadvantage. In drafting
the original Constitution, the Indian framers expressly provided for
such reservations in the context of public employment but made no
similar provision with respect to education.106 The SCI, in Madras v.
Dorairajan,107 read this omission to be significant and struck down at-
tempts by the State of Madras to reserve seats based on caste, gender,
and religious minority status in state medical and engineering colleges
as contrary to general principles of equality or nondiscrimination
under the Constitution. The relatively flexible amendment rule once
again allowed the Parliament to trump this decision.108 The First
Amendment inserted new language providing that nothing “shall pre-
vent the State from making any special provision for the advancement
of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for
101 See INDIA CONST., amended by Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.
102 INDIA CONST. art 19, cl. 2 (amended 1951).
103 (1950) SCR 594 (India).
104 Id. at 601–02.
105 The judgment in Thappar was handed down on May 26, 1950. (1950) SCR 594, 594
(India). In Parliament on May 16, 1951, Jawaharlal Nehru proposed that a bill to amend the
Constitution be placed before a select committee. See Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
(India).
106 See INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 3 (amended 1951).
107 (1951) SCR 525 (India).
108 See Statement of Objects and Reasons, The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
(India).
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the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.”109 In later cases such
as Balaji v. Mysore,110 the SCI affirmed this new language as sufficient
to give the state broad scope to make reservations in an educational
context based on caste.111
A similar pattern has taken hold in Colombia with respect to cer-
tain decisions made by the Colombian Constitutional Court. In Co-
lombia as well, the basic amendment threshold is quite flexible—
amendments can be passed using only a simple majority of Congress
in the first round and an absolute majority in the second.112 For exam-
ple, in 1994, the Court issued a landmark decision holding that posses-
sion of a small amount of drugs for personal use (a “personal dose”)
could not be criminalized or prohibited (even while leaving laws
prohibiting drug trafficking in place).113 The decision provoked signifi-
cant controversy and proved unpopular with Colombian politicians; a
series of presidents and other leaders backed constitutional amend-
ments to overturn it.114 In 2009, Congress passed an amendment par-
tially reversing the Court’s decision—the amendment allowed
Congress to prohibit the possession of a personal dose, while also tak-
ing criminal punishment out of play and holding that treatment and
counselling-based measures should be used instead, and always with
the consent of the affected person.115 The Colombian case perhaps
shows a kind of democratic dialogue between the Court and political
actors.116
109 See INDIA CONST. art. 15, § 4, amended by Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.
110 (1962) SCR (Supp. 1) 439 (India).
111 See id. at 441. The Court upheld a broad scope for such reservations in general and
simply insisted that in making them, the state target disadvantage or “backwardness” rather than
caste alone and respect some outer limit on the percentage of seats reserved. The Court deemed
a reservation of sixty-eight percent of seats as too high. Id. at 440.
112 See CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 375 (Colom.) (amended 2009),
translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., Anna I. Vellve´ Torras
& Jefri J. Ruchti trans., HeinOnline 2010).
113 See MANUEL JOSE CEPEDA ESPINOSA & DAVID LANDAU, COLOMBIAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 55 (2017) (discussing Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 5,
1994, Gaviria Diaz, J., Sentencia C-221/94 (Colom.)) (finding that prohibiting a “personal dose”
was unconstitutional).
114 See id. at 56.
115 See C.P. art. 49 (Colom.), translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay
Ruchti ed., Anna I. Vellve´ Torras, Jefri J. Ruchti & Maria del Carmen Gress trans., HeinOnline
2017); L. 2/09, diciembre 21, 2009, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 47,570 (COLOM.), http://www
.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=38289 [https://perma.cc/N3FZ-WQT7].
116 The amendment was subsequently challenged as an unconstitutional constitutional
amendment; this challenge was rejected on technical grounds, but the Court also emphasized
that the personal dose was prohibited but not criminalized by the amendment. See CEPEDA ESPI-
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Finally, consider the importance of judicial override as a source
of amendments in some U.S. states. In the states, amendment thresh-
olds are normally much more flexible than those found in the U.S.
Constitution and often include tools, like the ballot initiative, that al-
low popular involvement.117 In some states, for example, amendment
has been used to tie the hands of courts so that their criminal proce-
dure decisions under state constitutions are no more generous than
those made by the U.S. Supreme Court under the U.S. Constitution.118
This has often been in response to decisions that were perceived by
citizens or politicians as tilting the balance too far in favor of defend-
ants.119 More recently, amendment by popular initiative was used in
California to reverse judicial recognition of same-sex marriage by the
California Supreme Court,120 although this state constitutional amend-
ment was itself subsequently mooted by U.S. Supreme Court decisions
recognizing same-sex marriages as a U.S. constitutional right.121
As these examples suggest, the goal here is not to argue that par-
ticular amendments in response to judicial decisions are always desira-
ble from a normative perspective. The point instead is simply to note
that in some cases, allowing some scope for democratic override of
judicial decisions interpreting a constitution may be a good thing for a
democracy and that flexible amendment rules play this role much
more effectively than rigid ones.
NOSA & LANDAU, supra note 113, at 57 (discussing C.C., julio 22, 2011, Henao, J., Sentencia C-
574/11 (Colom.)).
117 See Dixon & Holden, supra note 23, at 195.
118 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (providing that state search and seizure provision
“shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court”); John Dinan, State Constitutionalism, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 863, 882–83 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. Graber
& Sanford Levinson eds., 2015) (providing examples).
119 See Dinan, supra note 118, at 882 (noting that the lockstep provision of the Florida
Constitution was a response to a Florida Supreme Court decision interpreting the Florida Con-
stitution to provide more protection against electronic eavesdropping than that provided by the
U.S. Supreme Court applying the Federal Constitution).
120 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401 (Cal. 2008); See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (Cali-
fornia Marriage Protection Act, Proposition 8 (Nov. 4, 2008)), invalidated by Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693
(2013).
121 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (holding that there is a federal
constitutional right to same sex marriage); Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 697 (holding that plaintiffs
lacked standing to challenge a lower court ruling striking down Proposition 8).
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C. A Democratic Safety Valve: Preventing Constitutional
Replacement and Pressure on Courts
There are also potentially important pragmatic reasons for a de-
mocracy to allow a reasonable scope for formal constitutional change.
Placing an entire democratic constitution in a legal “iron cage” may
encourage political elites to turn to other mechanisms for achieving
change, which may be more difficult to constrain, more destabilizing,
or more damaging to judicial independence and the rule of law.122
1. Avoiding Constitutional Replacement
Even provisions that make a constitution formally unamendable
do not completely foreclose the possibility of formal constitutional
change to relevant provisions. This is because even if the tools of con-
stitutional amendment are blocked, there is always some possibility of
replacing the existing constitution entirely, or, in other words, of writ-
ing a new constitution.123 Whether replacement is a realistic possibility
of course depends in part on assumptions embedded in a given legal
and constitutional culture. Within the United States, for example, San-
ford Levinson has argued that the difficulty of amendment under Ar-
ticle V coupled with significant flaws in the existing constitutional text
means that Americans should be willing to consider the possibility of
constitutional replacement by convening a series of new constitutional
conventions designed to achieve this result.124 Aside from certain sym-
pathetic segments of the academy, however, wholesale constitutional
replacement is hard to envision in the United States. The U.S. Consti-
tution simply has too long a history and is too venerated by the Amer-
ican public for constitutional replacement to be a realistic response (at
least for most people) to the rigidity of formal constitutional amend-
ment under Article V.
In many newer democracies, in contrast, there is weaker popular
and elite attachment to existing constitutional arrangements, and,
thus, it is more plausible to think that limits on constitutional amend-
ment may lead to a process of constitutional replacement.125 Imposing
122 For constitutions that authorize authoritarian rule, preventing constitutional change will
of course be even more damaging from a democratic perspective. E.g., Ridwanul Hoque, The
Recent Emergency and the Politics of the Judiciary in Bangladesh, 2 NUJS L. REV. 183 (2009)
(India).
123 See David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Constraining Constitutional Change, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 859, 867–70 (2015) (noting the feasibility of replacement as a substitute for
amendment in recent projects of authoritarian constitutional change).
124 See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED 331–45 (2012).
125 It is relevant in this light that the average lifespan of a constitution is under twenty
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limits on the formal power of constitutional amendment may thus in-
crease the incentive for dominant political elites to turn to constitu-
tional replacement as a means of achieving desired forms of
constitutional change.
Compared to constitutional amendment, processes of constitu-
tional replacement may be harder for law or legal institutions to con-
strain. This Article’s authors argue elsewhere that it is both possible to
imagine imposing legal constraints on processes of constitutional re-
placement and, moreover, that such restraints have actually existed in
practice.126 However, restrictions on constitution-making may be anti-
thetical to some versions of classical constituent power theory.127 They
may also be practically difficult for courts to successfully enforce or
deploy.128
Because constitution-making moments theoretically put the en-
tire constitutional order up for grabs, they may place institutional sta-
bility at greater risk. Again, this point can be overstated—Ozan Varol
for example has pointed out that constitutionalism is “sticky,” such
that many provisions tend to remain in national constitutions even af-
ter processes of wholesale replacement.129 But compared to amend-
ment, replacement may still place the basic institutional order at a
higher risk of change.
Constitutional amendment procedures, in this sense, can thus
serve not only as a vehicle for constitutional change. They can also
serve as an important “safety valve” against the possibility of more
sweeping, and potentially more destructive, forms of change.130
years. See ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 3, at 2 (citing an average constitutional
lifespan of nineteen years in a statistical study).
126 See Landau & Dixon, supra note 123, at 876–88 (surveying a range of procedural and
substantive restraints on constitution-making); see also Joel I. Colon-Rios, A New Typology of
Judicial Review of Legislation, 3 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 143, 162–68 (2014) (examining
the emergence of a possible new model of judicial review where courts will review the exercise
of the constituent power in replacement processes).
127 Colon-Rios, supra note 126, at 168 (arguing that such a conception would involve the
“rejection of popular sovereignty as providing the ultimate basis for the authority of a constitu-
tional system”).
128 See Landau & Dixon, supra note 123, at 870 (arguing that the best way to understand
limits in this area is pragmatic rather than philosophical or conceptual).
129 See Ozan O. Varol, Constitutional Stickiness, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 899, 902–03 (2016);
see also ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 3, at 57–59 (finding, through statistical tests,
that most constitutional provisions are unaltered even by a process of constitutional
replacement).
130 See Landau & Dixon, supra note 123, at 873–75.
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2. Avoiding Pressure on Courts
Another danger of having formal processes of constitutional
amendment that are too onerous is that dominant political actors may
look for ways of achieving desired forms of change via informal
means, such as by placing pressure on the judiciary. Take Nicaragua as
an example. In 2009, President Daniel Ortega attempted to extend his
own term in office by proposing formal amendments to existing presi-
dential term limits.131 When that proposal was defeated in the national
legislative assembly, he turned to informal modes of constitutional
change involving a petition to the Supreme Court of Nicaragua argu-
ing that the relevant constitutional provision creating the term limit
was itself an unconstitutional constitutional amendment.132 Ortega
succeeded in this unusual argument before the Court, but only after
launching a direct attack on judicial independence in Nicaragua.133
The bench that heard the case was composed entirely of Sandinista-
appointed judges.134 This was no accident; as the European Union
noted, the panel that heard the case “met during the night, in the ab-
sence of three of the six member judges, who were not invited and
who were replaced by three pro-government judges.”135
India provides another example. In endorsing a doctrine of un-
constitutional constitutional amendment, the SCI created a check
against the potential for future abuse of constitutional change.136 Yet
in doing so, in the short term, the Court also increased incentives for
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to turn to more informal methods to
achieve her political program. One of these methods involved a direct
attack on the independence of the Indian judiciary. One of the
hallmarks of judicial independence in India has been the understand-
ing that the appointment of its Chief Justice should not reflect any
form of “reward” for decisionmaking loyal to or approved by the gov-
ernment but rather should be based strictly on norms of seniority.137
Indira Gandhi, however, directly flouted that convention in response
131 See Rosalind Dixon & Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutions Inside Out: Outsider Interventions
in Domestic Constitutional Contests, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 149, 163 (2013).
132 Id. at 163–64.
133 See id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 203 (citation omitted).
136 Bharati v. Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India).
137 See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Declarations of Independence: Judicial Reactions to Polit-
ical Pressure, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS 227, 254 (Stephen B. Burbank &
Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
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to Bharati v. Kerala.138 She passed over three Justices in the majority
in the case for appointment to be the Chief Justice, thereby seeking to
create a Court more favorable to upholding the validity of future con-
stitutional amendments or legislation, and shortly thereafter she de-
clared a state of emergency for two years.139
The danger of such informal constitutional change is its tendency
to further control the judiciary beyond the specific issue that began
the initial attack on judicial independence.140 This is particularly true
in newer or more fragile democracies where a tradition of judicial in-
dependence may be lacking.141 In these contexts, attempts to pack a
court with judges loyal to the government, or dominant political elite,
may have a pronounced and pernicious effect on judicial behavior. For
core constitutional disputes, courts may lack the independence neces-
sary to serve as a check on governmental power. And courts that have
been deliberately stacked with judges loyal to the government may
lack basic professional legal skills or public confidence of the kind
needed to settle disputes even in ordinary cases.
III. THE VIRTUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIDITY
Rigid constitutions, of course, have their own benefits, some of
which this Article highlights. It focuses here on the avoidance of abu-
sive forms of constitutional change that threaten to erode democracy
because that is perhaps the least known of the major benefits and the
one that is most relevant to this Article’s argument.
A. Stability and the Separation of Ordinary and Constitutional
Politics
Rigid constitutions by definition are more difficult to change than
flexible ones; this may result in increasing the stability of the existing
constitutional order. Stability is of course not an unalloyed good; for
reasons laid out above, constitutions at times may need to be updated
or changed as a democratic response to judicial decisionmaking.142 But
many theorists argue that frequent changes to at least certain aspects
of a constitutional order may have undesirable normative effects, ar-
138 (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India).
139 Scheppele, supra note 137, at 254.
140 See generally Gardbaum, supra note 10, at 295–303 (giving recent examples of retalia-
tory actions taken against constitutional courts and illustrating how a backlash often reaches
further than the event that instigated it).
141 Id. at 289.
142 See ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 3, at 162 (warning against excessive
rigidity).
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guing, for example, that constitutions act as focal points.143 In this
sense, they allow political and social actors to carry out their goals
more easily by permitting agreement on the basic rules by which deci-
sions are made.144 If these ground rules can be changed too easily and
too frequently, many of these benefits may be lost. Political elites and
social movements may be uncertain what these ground rules are or
may spend much of their time and effort fighting over what the
ground rules should be rather than seeking other goals within that
framework.145
Constitutions are also often seen as self-commitment devices,
modelled on Ulysses binding himself to the mast in order to resist the
lure of the Sirens.146 Written constitutions in this sense may allow a
polity to resist temporary majoritarian impulses that are harmful to
the long-term health of the country. A number of different goals of
constitutionalism might be served by this kind of self-commitment.
For example, populist political movements might suggest a set of eco-
nomic or social measures that will produce short-term gains, such as
increases in economic growth, but at a long-term cost to political or
economic institutions, or to other long-term goals like environmental
health.147 Constitutions may limit these projects by committing the po-
litical system to a set of institutions or goals that cannot be easily
changed in the short run. Similarly, temporary majorities may seek to
repress minority groups, but in the longer term, all groups may be
better off—for economic, social, and political reasons—if such repres-
sion cannot be carried out by shifting majorities.148 Again, constitu-
tionalism may help ameliorate this problem by limiting the ability of
political majorities to take such action.
The self-commitment model makes the most sense with a rela-
tively rigid conception of constitutional change, where there is separa-
tion between the thresholds for normal political processes like
lawmaking and constitutional amendment. Without this separation,
self-commitment may fail because majoritarian forces will be able to
143 See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Creating a Self-Stabilizing
Constitution: The Role of the Takings Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 601, 612 (2015).
144 David A. Strauss, Legitimacy, “Constitutional Patriotism,” and the Common Law Con-
stitution, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 50, 51–52 (2012).
145 See id. at 51 (noting that a constitution “resolves some issues so that we do not have to
relitigate them constantly”).
146 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMIT-
MENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 88–89 (2000).
147 Cf. John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1929, 1958 (2003).
148 See Ferejohn, supra note 23, at 503–04.
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easily use the mechanisms of constitutional change to enshrine their
will.149 Rather than reflecting the long-term good of the political sys-
tem, constitutions may become reflections of short-term goals and
desires, just like ordinary politics. For example, short-term majorities
interested in changing a constitution to better repress minority rights
will be able to do so easily if they must merely meet a threshold simi-
lar to that found in ordinary politics.
The relationship between stability, self-commitment, and the
threshold for formal constitutional amendment is a complex one. This
is because of the existence, noted above, of substitutes for formal con-
stitutional change, such as informal constitutional change and whole-
sale constitutional replacement.150 In some contexts, a threshold for
formal constitutional change that is too high may incentivize actors to
pursue other routes of change that are more destabilizing of the con-
stitutional order. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton,
for example, present empirical evidence that constitutions are most
likely to avoid replacement if they have an intermediate level of
amendment difficulty rather than a very high one or a very low one.151
The key intuition is that while extremely flexible constitutions may
lose their basic stability, making replacement likely, extremely rigid
ones may push political leaders towards complete replacement be-
cause of their inability to pursue constitutional amendment. And this
relationship may be especially problematic if, as seems likely, constitu-
tion-making processes that replace an existing constitution entirely
are especially destabilizing. The need for stability may thus suggest
the desirability of some rigidity in the amendment rule, but perhaps
not a highly rigid constitution.
B. Identity and Constitutional Culture
An understudied but potentially important point concerns the re-
lationship between the threshold for constitutional change and the
identification of citizens with their constitutional text. This identifica-
tion may be important in realizing a range of goals associated with
constitutionalism. For example, it may enhance stability by making re-
placement less likely; popular buy-in of existing constitutions will in-
crease resistance to attempts to scrap the existing constitutional text.
It may also aid social and political forces in realizing the objectives
149 See Dixon, supra note 8, at 102.
150 See supra Section II.C.
151 See ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 3, at 139–41.
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enshrined in a constitution by increasing support for those objectives
and thus placing pressure on politicians to achieve them.
It is plausible that there is some relationship between thresholds
for constitutional change and the degree of popular buy-in that a con-
stitution is likely to receive. As Richard Albert has pointed out,
thresholds for constitutional change have a symbolic as well as practi-
cal purpose.152 That is, they help to mark out the most fundamental
values of a polity.153 Where, for example, certain constitutional provi-
sions are made impossible to change or especially difficult to change
(such as the German human dignity clause), they send a message
about the importance of those constitutional provisions.154 In this
sense, when rigid constitutions create a clear separation between ordi-
nary and constitutional politics, they may also increase the importance
and centrality of constitutions to citizens.
Rigidity may also tend to be correlated with other aspects of con-
stitutional design. As noted by several scholars, for example, the ex-
treme difficulty of amendment in the United States may be correlated
with a relatively brief, framework Federal Constitution that often lays
out just the broad outlines of institutional design.155 The brevity of the
constitutional text may reduce the need for frequent updating, while
the lack of detail in many of the Constitution’s provisions may facili-
tate the operation of substitutes for formal change, such as judicial
interpretation or informal change through other political institu-
tions.156 In contrast, the model explored by, among others, Mila Ver-
steeg and Emily Zackin is one where constitutions are more flexible
and also lengthier and more detailed.157 Increased length and detail
may increase the need for flexible tools of constitutional change be-
cause these constitutions may need to be updated more often and be-
cause increased detail may reduce the salience of informal means of
change. It may be that the length of constitutions, for example, is also
correlated with degrees of popular identification—citizens may recog-
nize and assimilate core constitutional values more easily if these are
152 Albert, Expressive Function, supra note 13, at 227.
153 See id.
154 See id. at 266.
155 See, e.g., Versteeg & Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism, supra note 3, at
1701.
156 See supra Sections II.A, II.B.
157 See Versteeg & Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism, supra note 3, at
1702–05.
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found in a briefer rather than lengthier text. The issue, at any rate,
needs more empirical investigation.158
C. Deterring Abusive Acts of Constitutional Change
If constitutional amendment procedures are too flexible, they
may pose distinct dangers to democracy and the rule of law; dominant
political elites may rely on formal amendment procedures to under-
mine even quite thin procedural notions of democracy, such as the
idea of a system of government based on regular free and fair elec-
tions.159 Identifying the threat to democracy in this way uses a mini-
malist understanding of democracy. The protection of free and fair
elections is an idea of democracy that almost all political theorists can
endorse, regardless of their particular, potentially more expansive, un-
derstanding of democracy.160 It represents a form of overlapping con-
sensus among different or competing understandings of democracy,
based on a willingness to leave certain other ideas about democracy to
the side for the purpose of reaching agreement on a common “demo-
cratic minimum core.”161 Yet it is also an understanding of democracy
that, in many countries around the world, is increasingly threatened—
by attempts of dominant political elites to insulate themselves from
meaningful electoral competition or accountability and to entrench
their own hold on power.162 “Abusive” constitutional practices of this
158 A recent study of popular identification with U.S. state constitutions finds no relation-
ship between the age, length, or frequency of amendment of a constitution and its degree of
support by citizens in a survey. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Mila Versteeg, The Contours
of Constitutional Approval, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 113, 152 (2016). These results might show the
irrelevance of constitutional design to constitutional identification, the availability of substitutes
that serve as loci of popular identification, or the lack of salience of subnational constitutions to
the lives of most citizens.
159 We do not focus on a related issue: overly flexible amendment rules in the early years of
a constitution’s operation may in some cases undermine the necessary incentive for all parties to
invest in the relevant constitutional bargain or system. See Huq, supra note 5, at 1228. Often,
however, this danger of overly flexible amendment can be addressed via a temporary limit on
formal constitutional amendment, or amendment “freeze.” See id. at 1229. For examples of these
kinds of provisions, see U.S. CONST. art. V (regarding slavery); Constitution of the Irish Free
State 1922 art. 50 (varying amendment procedures for the first eight years of the Constitution);
1958 CONST. art. 7 (Fr.) (prohibiting amendment when the President of the Republic has re-
signed, died, or been impeached).
160 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 143–50 (2003).
161 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1907–08
(2006).
162 As Levitsky and Way point out, this is often done through measures that make states
“competitive authoritarian” regimes, where nonfraudulent elections are still held, but incum-
bents compete on an unequal playing field where they are very difficult to dislodge. See STEVEN
LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM 5–7 (2010).
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kind frequently involve reliance on formal processes of constitutional
amendment.163
In Hungary, for instance, after gaining power in 2010 with a sim-
ple majority of votes but over two-thirds of seats, the Fidesz Party
began amending the Hungarian Constitution, which could be done by
Parliament alone through a two-thirds majority, to reduce the jurisdic-
tion and powers of key institutions like the Constitutional Court.164 It
then engaged in wholesale constitutional replacement, which it also
asserted could be carried out by the two-thirds majority.165 The new
Constitution weakened checking institutions designed to rein in elec-
toral majorities and made it harder to dislodge the incumbent party
from power.166
In Zimbabwe, after winning office in 1980, President Robert
Mugabe likewise began to use a variety of tactics to retain his hold on
power, including a series of constitutional amendments that could be
carried out through a two-thirds amendment threshold.167 Throughout
the 1980s, with the support of a ZANU-PF-controlled Parliament,
Mugabe introduced amendments giving the President greater control
over judicial appointments, creating an executive rather than ceremo-
nial presidency, abolishing the office of prime minister and the Senate,
and creating a unicameral parliament.168 In parallel to this, he also
sought to shore up the dominance of ZANU-PF via a system of eco-
nomic patronage involving the redistribution of formerly white-owned
land, largely to ZANU-PF supporters.169 And to allow this, he again
relied on processes of formal constitutional amendment.
163 See Landau, supra note 2, at 195 (defining “abusive constitutionalism” as “the use of
mechanisms of constitutional change in order to make a state significantly less democratic than it
was before”); Kim Lane Scheppele, Not Your Father’s Authoritarianism: The Creation of the
“Frankenstate,” EUR. POL. & SOC’Y NEWSL. (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Washington, D.C.), Winter
2013, at 5, 5 (discussing an evolved form of authoritarianism that relies on combinations of con-
stitutional mechanisms).
164 See, e.g., Gabor Halmai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: Constitutional
Courts as Guardians of the Constitution? 19 CONSTELLATIONS 182 (2012); Scheppele, supra note
163.
165 Scheppele, supra note 163, at 7–8.
166 Id.; see also Miklo´s Ba´nkuti, Ga´bor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Illiberal
Turn: Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 139–40 (2012).
167 Lloyd Sachikonye, Constitutionalism, the Electoral System and Challenges for Govern-
ance and Stability in Zimbabwe, 4 AFR. J. ON CONFLICT RESOL. 171, 174–77 (2004).
168 See id.
169 See Norma Kriger, Liberation from Constitutional Constraints: Land Reform in
Zimbabwe, 27 SAIS REV. INT’L AFF. 63, 71 (2007); Robert B. Lloyd, Zimbabwe: The Making of
an Autocratic “Democracy,” 101 CURRENT HIST. 219, 220 (2002); John McClung Nading, Prop-
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A similar pattern applies in Latin America. In Venezuela, for ex-
ample, upon taking power in 1998, President Hugo Chavez used con-
stitutional replacement largely to sweep the institutional order clean
and shut down institutions still allied with the opposition, as well as to
entrench more power in the presidency.170 Similarly, in Ecuador, Pres-
ident Rafael Correa quickly replaced the Ecuadorian Constitution in
2008 after coming to power, thereby allowing him to pack key institu-
tions, strengthen the presidency, and pursue ideological goals.171 In
both countries, leaders subsequently adopted a process of constitu-
tional amendment after these replacements had been carried out. The
key goal of these proposed amendments in both countries was to elim-
inate presidential term limits.172 Elsewhere in Latin America, includ-
ing in Colombia, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras, leaders have
sought constitutional changes to lengthen or eliminate presidential
term limits.173
A more rigid amendment rule may make constitutional changes
that weaken democracy more difficult. This is true even though lead-
ers also rely on other mechanisms, such as informal change and plac-
ing pressure on courts for favorable interpretations. Venezuela offers
an interesting example: after replacing the Venezuelan Constitution,
Chavez used a combination of formal and informal tools to maintain
power. For example, the Constitution created a new appointment
mechanism for the Supreme Court that gave a significant role to civil
society; however, Chavez used transitional appointments and other
tools to make sure that he did not lose control of the Court to inde-
pendent factions of civil society.174 Chavez also used a mix of formal
and informal mechanisms to control the media and weaken the politi-
cal opposition.175 Using informal means, in other words, he under-
erty Under Siege: The Legality of Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 737, 756
(2002).
170 See, e.g., ALLEN R. BREWER-CARIAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA 54–55
(2010); David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. 923, 941–49 (2013).
171 See Catherine M. Conaghan, Ecuador: Correa’s Plebiscitary Presidency, 19 J. DEMOC-
RACY 46, 51–52 (2008).
172 See David Landau, Term Limits Manipulation Across Latin America—and What
Constitutional Design Could Do About It, CONSTITUTIONNET (July 21, 2015), http://www
.constitutionnet.org/news/term-limits-manipulation-across-latin-america-and-what-constitution
al-design-could-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/3HSZ-DLPJ].
173 See id.; Nicholas Casey, Bolivian President Concedes Defeat in Term-Limit Referendum,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/25/world/americas/bolivian-
president-evo-morales-concedes-defeat-in-term-limit-referendum.html [https://perma.cc/YS68-
GAJB].
174 See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 170, at 106–07.
175 See id. at 153.
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mined the tools in his own new Constitution in order to maintain
power. Much existing scholarship on so-called hybrid regimes, those
stuck between democracy and dictatorship, has emphasized their reli-
ance on informal institutions and informal methods of change.176
However, as the examples above demonstrate, formal constitu-
tional change is central to many projects of democratic erosion.177 The
main reason seems to be that there are some changes that are much
more difficult to carry out through alternative means. Term limits,
which are generally enshrined in clear and specific terms in a constitu-
tional text, offer an interesting example.178 In some contexts, where
the rule of law is very weak at the domestic and international level, it
may be possible for executives to simply overstay their constitutional
terms without paying any significant penalty. But increasingly, re-
gimes may face substantial domestic and international repercussions
for remaining in power beyond their allotted mandate. And given the
rule-like quality of term limits, it is very difficult to envision informal
changes or judicial interpretations that would achieve the same result
as formal constitutional change.179 Put more generally, to achieve at
least some key goals, actors seeking to undermine democracy will
often prefer or require resort to formal mechanisms of constitutional
change.
In the United States, for example, the rigid amendment mecha-
nism of Article V of course would not serve as a protection against
any form of democratic erosion. Such a belief would be a foolish one.
Take the judiciary as an example. Political actors could potentially use
ordinary law to carry out a range of attacks against the federal judici-
ary and the Supreme Court, such as abolishing the lower federal
courts, cutting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court through the Ex-
ceptions Clause, packing the Court through adding more Justices, or
cutting the budget of the judiciary.180 Informal means, such as bribing
or threatening Justices, could also be used (and indeed have been used
in other countries with similar formal designs to those found in the
176 See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 162, at 27–28 (arguing that “informal institutions” are
particularly crucial to the dynamics of competitive authoritarianism).
177 See Landau, supra note 2, at 212–14.
178 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, James Melton & Zachary Elkins, On the Evasion of Executive
Term Limits, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1807, 1814 (2011) (finding that “term limits are surpris-
ingly effective in constraining executives from extending their terms” in democratic systems).
179 In this sense, a term limit is similar to the numerical clauses studied above in Section
II.A that cannot usually be updated through judicial or other informal means.
180 For a reflection on some of these methods, see Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the
Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1004–05 (1965).
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United States).181 But the extreme difficulty of formal amendment
would plausibly hinder certain kinds of changes. Without a formal
amendment, for example, it is much less likely that a would-be auto-
crat would be able to extend his or her presidential term limit and stay
beyond eight years. It might also be true that certain kinds of reduc-
tions in the protection of individual rights (such as the criminalization
of core political speech) would also be difficult to carry out without
formal change to the First Amendment.182
IV. THE CASE FOR A TIERED SYSTEM OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The virtues of both the flexible and rigid models of constitutional
change are substantial. The flexible model in some sense empowers
the democratic populace to exercise ongoing oversight of their institu-
tional order, allowing them to update the constitutional text fre-
quently so as to control their political agents and preventing
overreliance on judges as a mode of constitutional change. The rigid
model defends the stability and identity of core democratic institu-
tions, helping to protect against the possibility of erosion.
Constitutional designers do not face the sharp trade-off between
these two competing models that is sometimes assumed.183 It is natural
that designers would, in many contexts, seek to serve both of these
sets of goals. One possibility, examined first in Section IV.A, is that
designers could select a level of constitutional change that reflects an
181 In Argentina, for example, Supreme Court Judges also have life tenure, but presidents
have historically used bribes and threats to force resignations in order to gain a supportive
Court. See GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRES-
IDENTS IN ARGENTINA 62, 65 (2005); Christopher J. Walker, Judicial Independence and the Rule
of Law: Lessons from Post-Menem Argentina, 14 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 89, 103 (2007).
182 In this sense, designers who seek constitutional rigidity as protection against abusive
constitutionalism must, of course, also be concerned with the alternative of constitutional re-
placement. As noted above in Part III, one impact of a rigid constitution may be to encourage
political leaders to seek replacement or constitution-making processes. The examples here in-
clude many cases where leaders sought replacement alongside of (as in Hungary) or instead of
(as in Venezuela) constitutional amendment. In the United States, of course, constitutional re-
placement is virtually unthinkable, despite the rigid amendment rule found in Article V, because
of the distinctive nature of U.S. constitutional culture. But in many other contexts, it is clear that
political leaders view amendment and replacement as substitutes and thus that one unintended
byproduct of rigid amendment rules might be to encourage more constitutional replacement. See
Landau & Dixon, supra note 123, at 865 (noting that “replacement, like amendment, is a poten-
tial tool for democratic abuse”).
183 See, e.g., Versteeg & Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism, supra note 3, at
1700–05 (contrasting two models of constitutionalism, one with a “spare and entrenched” frame-
work and the other which is characterized by “broad scope, highly detailed nature, and popular
responsiveness”).
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average level of difficulty between rigidity and flexibility. The alterna-
tive, examined in Section IV.B, is for a tiered or hybrid system of con-
stitutional change, in which some parts of the constitution are
relatively easy to change and others are more difficult. This hybrid
design, which, as already shown, is quite popular in comparative con-
stitutional law, best responds to the contrasting strengths of each style
of constitutional change.
A. A “Moderate” Level of Amendment Difficulty
One way in which drafters may respond to the contrasting
strengths of the two models is to adopt an amendment rule that re-
quires moderate but not extremely high levels of supermajority sup-
port for the legislative proposal or approval of amendments.
Constitutions worldwide adopt a range of different procedures for
constitutional amendment. They alternately require the popular ratifi-
cation of amendments, legislation that proposes an amendment con-
taining a single subject be passed twice by different houses or in
different time periods, ratification within a certain time frame, or
some combination of these requirements.184 They also adopt a range
of distinct supermajority thresholds for the legislative proposal or ap-
proval of amendments.
Some empirical studies have shown that the level of
supermajority support required for the proposal of an amendment in a
legislative setting is a determinant of the actual success of constitu-
tional amendment.185 There is also evidence of a positive correlation
between constitutions adopting a “moderately difficult” procedure for
constitutional amendment and the chances that a constitution will sur-
vive or endure over the long term. Donald Lutz, for instance, found in
a study of thirty national constitutions that both an easy amendment
process and a very difficult amendment process (which leads to a very
low amendment rate) produce a higher probability that a constitution
will be replaced entirely.186 Similarly, in a much larger study of global
184 See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 8, at 104–08; Bjorn Erik Rasch & Roger D. Congleton,
Amendment Procedures and Constitutional Stability, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
AND PUBLIC POLICY 319, 326–32 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2014).
185 See, e.g., Dixon & Holden, supra note 23, at 198; Ferejohn, supra note 23, at 524. But see
Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 4, at 712 (finding no statistically significant relationship between
amendment difficulty and amendment rate and arguing that cultural variables are more likely to
explain amendment rates).
186 Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 245 (San-
ford Levinson ed., 1995).
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constitutions across time, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton found that
constitutions that are moderately difficult to amend are less likely to
be replaced than those that have extremely permissive or demanding
formal requirements for constitutional amendment.187
A “moderately” difficult supermajority requirement for the legis-
lative proposal or approval of amendments is thus one possible way of
balancing the expected benefits and costs of amendment flexibility;
unlike some other procedural requirements (such as a single-subject
rule or double passage), supermajority rules can be calibrated at a va-
riety of different levels of difficulty. A unitary and moderate amend-
ment rule, however, achieves neither the virtues of flexibility nor
those of rigidity all that well. That is, the threshold chosen may be too
high to make constitutional provisions as easily updatable as would be
desirable.188 At the same time, it may be too low to provide stability to
the constitutional text or to prevent abusive forms of constitutional
change.189 Absent the very limited empirical data noted above, there is
no particular reason to believe that the optimum is a halfway point
between rigidity and flexibility since such a point may simply sacrifice
many of the benefits of both systems.
More precisely, it may be helpful to think of constitutions as con-
taining different kinds of provisions with different functions. These
different kinds of provisions vary in terms of their needs and risks of
constitutional change. In lengthy constitutions, for example, detailed,
specific, and technical provisions may need frequent updating. Take a
provision explaining the distribution of fiscal resources between dif-
ferent levels of government. The initial allocation of these resources
may prove unworkable, or an initially satisfactory allocation may be-
come problematic with time. In contrast, other kinds of provisions
may have less of a need to be updated, such as basic principles of the
state, which should not change frequently, or changes that may be
both more destabilizing and more dangerous to democracy, as with at
least some rules governing the functioning of state institutions like
courts. Based on experience, and without denying that the particular
balance is often contextual, there is at least some knowledge of which
kinds of provisions fall in which of these categories. The broad point is
that constitutions are heterogeneous texts and different kinds of pro-
visions should be treated differently,190 while a unified amendment
187 ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 3, at 140–41.
188 See supra Section II.A.
189 See supra Section III.C.
190 See Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Competitive Democracy and the Constitutional
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rule would impose the same moderate level of difficulty across the
entire text.
B. Tiered Constitutional Design
As emphasized above in Part I, many constitutional designers
seem to have recognized and responded to this logic by using a multi-
track system of constitutional change rather than a uniform or single-
track system. There are of course a number of ways to do this, as ex-
plored in more detail below. Ideally, however, a multitrack system of
constitutional change should allow constitutional design to respond to
the various benefits of a both flexible and rigid system.
For example, in such a system, the default rule for constitutional
change can be relatively undemanding. Thus, if political actors need to
update constitutional provisions, they will likely be able to do so. The
facility of formal change should reduce reliance on other means of
constitutional updating like judicial interpretation. Moreover, the abil-
ity of political actors to overrule courts on many questions of judicial
interpretation should reduce the force of the counter-majoritarian dif-
ficulty and of political pressures to pack judiciaries or attack judicial
independence.191 At any rate, when working with a detailed and
lengthy constitutional text (as is now the norm around the world), a
relatively flexible background rule of constitutional change seems like
a virtual necessity. There is no other way for democratic actors to
make changes to obsolete or unworkable provisions in the text, short
of the highly destabilizing alternative of wholesale constitutional
replacement.192
At the same time, the key contribution of a tiered system is to
capture some of the benefits of a rigid system of constitutional change.
Through some combination of express constitutional text and judicial
interpretation, change to certain constitutional articles may be made
either more difficult or impossible. The rigidity of these provisions
may protect the stability of certain aspects of the constitutional order,
thus preserving the value of the constitution as a focal point and
precommitment device and perhaps defending against forms of consti-
tutional change that pose a threat to the democratic order.193 If de-
signers or courts can, for example, identify constitutional provisions or
Minimum Core, in ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 268, 269 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz
Z. Huq eds., 2016).
191 See supra Sections II.B, II.C.
192 See supra Section II.A.
193 See supra Part III.
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classes of change that pose a particularly substantial threat of demo-
cratic erosion, they can require more onerous procedures to make
these changes or, in the extreme, attempt to make changes to these
provisions impossible by any means. When a constitution makes its
strict one-term limit on presidents unamendable (as in Honduras)194
or when it requires more demanding procedures, like a referendum,
for changes to the “fundamental structure” of the state (as in Ecua-
dor),195 the text may be playing a role in enhancing the stability of
core parts of the constitutional text and in fending off attempts at
democratic erosion.
The identification of certain norms or values as especially pro-
tected may also build a sense of identity or constitutional culture
around a constitution, despite the flexibility of most of its provisions.
For example, the unamendable clauses of the Brazilian Constitution196
or the specially protected fundamental principles of the South African
Constitution197 may serve as a basis for popular identification, even
though both documents are quite detailed and lengthy overall. In ef-
fect, a tiered system of constitutional change may be part of a process
through which a longer constitution gains an identity as a statement of
founding normative values and as a more fundamental text than ordi-
nary legislation.
All of this, of course, is just a theoretical case for a tiered system
of constitutional change. It demonstrates that a multitrack model
might be able to combine the virtues of a flexible and rigid system of
constitutional change. This Article has not yet demonstrated how such
a system could be designed or whether it is likely to achieve its goals
in practical terms. The rest of this Article is devoted to those tasks.
The upshot is that a large number of countries are using these tools,
but there is still much to learn about the functionality of these tiered
designs in different contexts. The task is a worthwhile albeit extremely
challenging one.
194 CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE LA REPU´BLICA DE HONDURAS [HONDURAS CONST.] 1982,
art. 374, translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., Maria del
Carmen Gress & Jefri J. Ruchti trans., HeinOnline 2015).
195 ECUADOR CONST. arts. 441–442 (distinguishing an “amendment” procedure from a
“partial” reform procedure and requiring that the latter be used for certain forms of change).
196 See C.F. art. 60(4) (Braz.) (prohibiting amendments that are “aimed at abolishing” cer-
tain fundamental principles including federalism, “direct, secret, universal and periodic suf-
frage,” the “separation of powers,” and “individual rights and guarantees”).
197 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 74 (requiring a more demanding procedure for amendments
to certain basic principles).
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V. THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIERING
This Part surveys the possibilities of a multitrack design of consti-
tutional amendment rules, based on the practice of a wide range of
systems around the world. It would be far too ambitious, at least at
this stage, to seek a set of clear best practices. At any rate, the precise
content and strength of different designs for constitutional change will
inevitably be affected by the particular context for constitutional
drafting. In some cases, the context for a particular constitutional
transition may mean parties to constitutional negotiations are quite
willing to endorse a tiered approach to constitutional amendment,
whereas in others, parties’ concerns about lock-in, or investment in
the constitutional bargaining process, may mean they are unwilling to
adopt even a demanding uniform track for constitutional amend-
ment.198 Political considerations of this kind will inevitably dictate the
plausibility of the whole idea of tiering.
However, in contexts where tiering is politically plausible, this
Part seeks to explain the range of choices faced by constitutional de-
signers on this issue, as well as to clarify tradeoffs and illuminating
possibilities that have been underexplored in existing work. It treats a
range of issues: (a) the kinds of provisions given heightened protec-
tion and placed on a higher tier, (b) the choice between rule-like and
standard-like identification of the protected forms of constitutional
change, (c) the related choice between ex ante and ex post construc-
tion of protections, (d) the number of tiers, and (e) the kinds of proce-
dural devices used to make constitutional change more difficult at
higher tiers. Comparative experience illuminates the range of pos-
sibilities on each issue. Unfortunately, it also suggests that these
choices are sometimes made without full consideration of their
consequences.
At minimum, constitutional designers and courts should carefully
consider which provisions should be protected in light of the purposes
and functions of tiering. It is not always clear that this is done. Con-
sider for example the multitrack system of constitutional change in
California, which, like many U.S. states, distinguishes between a con-
stitutional “amendment” and a “revision,” a distinction that has been
actively policed by the courts.199 The main distinction between those
devices in California is that popular initiative can be used for amend-
ment but not revision, while the state legislature can initiate either
198 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Consti-
tutional Design, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 636, 638 (2011); Huq, supra note 5, at 1178.
199 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVIII.
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form of change.200 In recent caselaw, the California Supreme Court
has suggested that a change will be more likely deemed a revision if it
affects the structural or institutional pieces of the California Constitu-
tion and if it affects a large number of distinct provisions of the Con-
stitution.201 Thus, for example, the court allowed a popular initiative
to reverse judicial recognition of same-sex marriage in the state in
2009, holding in effect that this was not a change to structural provi-
sions that was sweeping enough to constitute a revision.202
The jurisprudence on the distinction may make little sense in light
of its function. It is unclear, for example, why popular initiative is
more suspect when used to alter structural provisions of the California
Constitution rather than rights provisions. The purpose of a popular
initiative would seem to be to allow the public to act as a direct check
on governmental institutions that might be seeking to entrench their
own power rather than serving the popular will. This concern would
seem to be at its highest when dealing with issues of structural and
institutional reform, where incumbents may use their position to
stymie necessary reforms that will harm their interests. In these con-
texts, the initiative may be a valuable way for the public to do an end-
run around self-interested political elites. In contrast, the risks of a
popular device like the initiative may be highest when a proposal at-
tacks a vulnerable minority group, as with the proposal to reverse rec-
ognition of same-sex marriage.203 Use of direct democracy devices like
the initiative in these contexts may raise significant concerns about
constitutionalism losing one of its core purposes, the protection of the
rights of minorities. In this sense, the California system clearly re-
sponds to the logic of tiering, but the substance of what is placed on
each tier may make little sense in light of the procedural differences
between the tiers.
200 See id.
201 See, e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 99 (Cal. 2009) (holding that a proposed change
reversing judicial recognition of same-sex marriage was not a revision because it did not work a
“substantial change in the governmental plan or structure,” regardless of whether it impacted a
“foundational constitutional principle”); Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Cal. 1990)
(holding that a proposed change forcing the California Supreme Court to interpret criminal pro-
cedure protections to be no more generous than those found in the Federal Constitution was a
revision because it worked “a fundamental change in our preexisting governmental plan”); Mc-
Fadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 796 (Cal. 1948) (emphasizing the sheer scope of a proposed
change and the number of provisions it would impact in labelling it a revision).
202 See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 99.
203 See id. at 106 (rejecting an argument that change should be considered a revision if it
limits rather than extends rights protections).
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A. The Objects of Protection
A first key question is what kinds of provisions or constitutional
changes should be placed on higher tiers, or, in other words, given
special degrees of protection within the constitutional order. An at-
tractive approach to tiering will focus on protecting the “democratic
minimum core” of constitutional provisions.204 This consists of those
provisions or aspects of the constitutional order that are essential for
the preservation of competitive electoral democracy.205 The European
Union’s accession criteria, for example, require a commitment to de-
mocracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minori-
ties.206 These minimal criteria for democracy emphasize the
importance of free elections, the right to form political parties, a free
press, liberty of speech and personal opinion, restrictions on executive
power, and access to independent courts.207
Another way to envision such a democratic minimum core is to
consider recent experiences with abusive constitutionalism or demo-
cratic erosion, such as those outlined above in countries like Vene-
zuela and Hungary. What emerges is the sensitivity of democracy
when the independence of institutions charged with checking incum-
bents or overseeing the electoral process is threatened. These institu-
tions vary depending on context, but almost always include courts,
and may include ombudspersons, electoral tribunals, and institutions
overseeing and regulating the media.208 By attacking these institutions,
incumbents can make themselves much more difficult to dislodge and
prevent the opposition from being able to compete on a level playing
field.209 Recent experience also suggests that, at least in presidential
systems, incumbents may undermine democracy by seeking to extend
or eliminate term limits.210 Although presidents in such a world would
204 See Dixon & Landau, supra note 190, at 268.
205 See id. at 276.
206 Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council § 7(A)(iii) (June 21–22, 1993).
207 See Roger J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession Procedure for the
Central European and Mediterranean States, 1 INT’L L. REV. 15, 24, 27–29, 42 (2003).
208 See, e.g., BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 170, at 57–60, 152–55 (explaining how Chavez
undermined the judiciary and other institutions such as the media); Ba´nkuti, Halmai & Schep-
pele, supra note 166, at 139–40, 143–44 (laying out how the Fidesz Party undertook changes to
undermine the Constitutional Court, ordinary judiciary, ombudspersons, and institutions regu-
lating the media).
209 See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 162, at 10–12 (noting how competitive authoritarian
regimes use unequal access to law and media to perpetuate their power and to undermine the
rights of opposition and minority groups).
210 See supra text accompanying notes 172–73 (describing recent experiences across Latin
America); see also Ginsburg, Melton & Elkins, supra note 178 (giving a number of examples).
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continue to face periodic competition from voters, there is a risk that
elections will become increasingly unequal affairs. Long-serving presi-
dents will likely use their formal powers, visibility, and informal mech-
anisms such as distribution of patronage to marginalize the opposition
and to weaken or take control of checking institutions such as courts.
Both perspectives therefore suggest a core set of institutions, lim-
its, and rights that might be protected under a “democratic minimum
core” approach. From the perspective outlined here, protection for
such a minimum core offers key advantages of a rigid system of consti-
tutional change. It should protect the stability of the basic institutional
order because changes to those institutions and provisions protecting
a minimal concept of electoral democracy will likely be among the
most destabilizing acts for a constitutional democracy. Such an ap-
proach should also provide protection against democratic erosion.
Furthermore, a minimalist approach allows constitutional design-
ers, judges, and other domestic and international political actors to
flesh out the content of the core through exploration of transnational
practice.211 Based on comparison with other democratic orders and
the lessons of experience, these actors can determine which provisions
are essential to competitive democracy and which kinds of changes are
most likely to pose a threat to those provisions.212 The amenability of
the democratic minimum core to transnational practice may ease the
operation of the system; it gives courts, for example, a set of tools with
which to determine whether intervention is appropriate.213 At the
same time, the use of transnational practice to determine a democratic
minimum core may help to inhibit judges or constitutional designers
from overplacing provisions or institutions on the higher tier. If a pro-
posed change based on transnational practice does not appear to pose
a significant threat to competitive democracy, then it should be altera-
ble using the constitution’s default amendment rules. Placing too
many forms of change on the higher tier essentially converts a tiered
constitution into a rigid one, forfeiting the benefits of a flexible system
of constitutional change. Overuse as well as underuse of tiered consti-
tutional architecture appears to be a major problem in comparative
experience.214
211 See generally Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a
Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 606
(2015).
212 See id. at 629–30.
213 Id.
214 See id. at 620–23 (giving examples of potential overuse of the unconstitutional constitu-
tional amendment doctrine in both India and Colombia).
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Many examples of tiering around the world are motivated by the
intuition of protecting a democratic minimum core. The 1996 South
African Constitution is one example. In South Africa, the Constitu-
tion adopts two distinct tracks for constitutional amendment. The or-
dinary requirements for amendment are that a bill proposing an
amendment be passed by a two-thirds majority in the National As-
sembly.215 The Constitution also creates a special set of requirements
for amendments to the amendment rule itself, as well as to Section
One of the Constitution, which sets out the founding values or princi-
ples of the Constitution. These are
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the ad-
vancement of human rights and freedoms.
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll,
regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic gov-
ernment, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and
openness[,]216
and the status of South Africa as “one, sovereign, democratic state.”217
Amendments to these provisions require a seventy-five percent
supermajority in the National Assembly and a supporting vote of six
provinces in the National Council of Provinces.218 Some of these re-
quirements may go beyond what is strictly required for a system of
competitive democracy, but the South African Constitution nonethe-
less provides one model for the tiering of constitutional amendment
rules based on a concern for competitive democracy, since it explicitly
targets the minimum institutional requirements for competitive de-
mocracy for special protection.
Other countries protect institutions or provisions based on do-
mestic, regional, or transnational experiences of democratic erosion.
Term limits offer a rich example. The Honduran Constitution from
1982 to 2015 (when the term limit was removed by the country’s Su-
preme Court) prevented any amendment to a constitutional provision
limiting presidents to one term.219 The Colombian Constitution, fol-
215 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 74(3).
216 Id. § 1.
217 Id. (emphasis added).
218 Id. § 74(1). There is also a third tier of amendment that protects the Bill of Rights, as
well as other matters affecting certain interests of the provinces. Id. § 74(2)–(3). This tier allows
amendment with a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly and a vote of six provinces in the
National Council of Provinces. Id.
219 See HONDURAS CONST. art. 374. It reinforced even this eternity clause by stating any
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lowing an episode in which the popular President Alvaro Uribe first
amended the Constitution to allow a second term and then attempted
an amendment to seek a third term as well (which was blocked by the
Colombian Constitutional Court),220 was recently changed back to a
one-term limit, now providing that any change to that provision could
only be done through a constituent assembly or a constitutional refer-
endum initiated by the public and not by Congress alone as with nor-
mal amendments.221 In both countries, historical experiences
suggested that term limits needed to be especially protected to defend
against abusive acts of constitutional change. Other countries inside
and outside the region, such as El Salvador, the Central African Re-
public, and Mauritania, contain provisions prohibiting amendment to
their provisions on presidential term limits as well.222
Finally, in a third set of countries, either the constitutional text
itself or judicial doctrine protects a concept such as the “basic struc-
ture,” “fundamental structure,” or “fundamental principles” of the
constitution and places these aspects of the constitution on a higher
tier. The constitutions of Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia, for exam-
ple, do this explicitly;223 in other countries, like India, it has been done
through judicial doctrine.224 Concepts like this are ambiguous and re-
quire significant interpretation by judges or other actors. However,
they may offer a reasonable hook through which to protect a demo-
cratic minimum core. In Colombia, for example, the Constitutional
Court’s decision denying President Uribe’s constitutional amendment
allowing a third consecutive term held that the proposal replaced fun-
damental principles of the existing constitutional text because it un-
dermined basic machinery of the democratic order.225 The Court
pointed out how a president’s extremely long tenure would create
official attempting to change that provision, or offering support to someone attempting to
change it, would be removed from office and barred from seeking public office for ten years. See
id. art. 239.
220 CEPEDA ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 113, at 352–53, 359 (discussing C.C., febrero
26, 2010, Sierra Porto, J., Sentencia C-141/10 (Colom.)).
221 See C.P. art. 197 (Colom.).
222 See C.A.R. art. 35 (Cent. Afr. Rep.); CONSTITUTION OF EL SALVADOR 1983, art. 248;
CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA 1991, art. 99.
223 ECUADOR CONST. arts. 441–442 (requiring that changes to the “fundamental structure”
of the constitution be carried out by a more demanding “partial” reform procedure rather than a
less demanding “amendment” procedure); see also VENEZUELA CONST. arts. 340, 342 (same);
CONST. art. 411 (Bol.) (same with respect to “fundamental bases” of Constitution).
224 See Bharati v. Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 985 (India).
225 CEPEDA ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 113, at 352 (discussing C.C., febrero 26, 2010,
Sierra Porto, J., Sentencia C-141/10 (Colom.)).
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substantial electoral inequality with any potential challengers, given
the president’s visibility and control of the patronage apparatus of the
state over time.226 The playing field would be heavily stacked against
potential challengers, particularly at the stage of a second reelection
bid. The decision also emphasized that a president in office for twelve
years would likely control virtually all of the independent institutions
(such as courts and prosecutors) that were charged with checking his
or her power.227 The Court bolstered this analysis with a review of
transnational practice, finding pure presidential systems allowing
more than two four-year terms in office to be extremely unusual and
potentially dangerous.228
In India, similarly, the Supreme Court’s use of the basic structure
doctrine has focused in large part on constitutional amendments that
pose a threat to judicial independence or jurisdiction, at times in a
context where democratic erosion had been a significant threat. Sev-
eral historical uses of the basic structure doctrine dealt with amend-
ments that sought to immunize important issues, such as
nationalizations and election disputes, from judicial review by taking
them outside of the SCI’s jurisdiction.229 In 2015, the SCI used the
doctrine to strike down an amendment that would have changed the
appointment procedure to the Court by replacing the historical col-
legium system, whereby judges themselves select new judges, with a
new judicial appointments commission that would have given the ex-
ecutive a far greater role in judicial appointments.230 These decisions
raise an obvious risk of self-protectionism, but there is also no doubt
that issues related to the independence of the judiciary can, in certain
cases, form part of the democratic minimum core.231
226 Id. at 356.
227 Id. at 354–55, 357 (giving an in-depth treatment of the interaction of a second reelection
on appointment mechanisms for the Constitutional Court, independent prosecutor’s office, and
other bodies).
228 Id. at 354; see also Dixon & Landau, supra note 211, at 632–33 (describing the Court’s
reliance on comparative experience).
229 See, e.g., Minerva Mills, Ltd. v. India, (1981) 1 SCR 206 (India) (striking down an at-
tempt to immunize all constitutional amendments from judicial review); Gandhi v. Narain, AIR
1975 SC 1590 (India) (suggesting that an attempt to strip the courts of power to review election
law was likely a violation of the basic structure doctrine); Bharati v. Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225
(India).
230 See Rehan Abeyratne, Upholding Judicial Supremacy in India: The NJAC Judgment in
Comparative Perspective, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 569, 569–74 (2017) (summarizing and
critiquing the decision).
231 Of course, the fact that certain issues connected to judicial design likely form part of the
minimum core does not mean that every aspect of that design does so. As Abeyratne points out,
the recent decision striking down changes to the judicial appointment rule protected a peculiar
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We also recognize that many forms of tiering respond to other
needs and values. Thus, constitutions commonly protect provisions
other than the democratic minimum core. As Richard Albert points
out, these provisions respond to a variety of different factors.232 Some-
times, it would appear that constitutional designers seek to specially
entrench provisions that are closely related to a country’s conception
of identity, for example, by protecting a monarchical role, religious
identity, or founding ideology.233 In other cases, provisions become
entrenched because of specific bargains that are struck between con-
tending political factions, and thus, the tiered provisions serve to pro-
tect that bargain.234 Two examples are the clause in the original U.S.
Constitution that prohibited the abolition of the slave trade before
1808 and the clause that allows amendments to the equal suffrage pro-
vision giving each state the same number of Senators with the consent
of all states.235 The former emerged as a bargain at the Constitutional
Convention between slave-holding and non-slave-holding states, while
the latter had its origins in a deal between high- and low-population
states.
Furthermore, some forms of tiering seem to respond to a thicker
conception of democracy than a minimal conception of electoral de-
mocracy. This may be what Judge Richard Posner has called “Concept
1” democracy, which bases itself on direct citizen participation and a
thicker conception of equality of persons, in contrast to a “Concept 2”
democracy, which is a minimal electoral democracy.236 Some constitu-
tions, for example, place all existing rights guarantees on a higher tier
requiring a more difficult process of change or simply prohibit
changes that limit those guarantees altogether.237 Given that many
form of judicial self-selection that is not found in most other democratic constitutions. See id. at
613. Exploration of comparative practice or transnational anchoring would be useful in deter-
mining what is truly part of the democratic minimum core. See Dixon & Landau, supra note 211,
at 630–37.
232 See Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, supra note 13, at 678–97 (developing a typology of
purposes of specially entrenched provisions).
233 See id. at 678–85.
234 See id. at 693.
235 U.S. CONST. art. V.
236 POSNER, supra note 160, at 131.
237 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO [CONGO
CONST.] 2006,  art. 220, translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed.,
Jefri J. Ruchti trans., HeinOnline 2011) (prohibiting “[a]ny constitutional revision having for its
object or for [its] effect the reduction of the rights and freedoms of the person”); CONSTITUTION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 1994, art. 142(2) (Constitutional Court Mold. trans., 2016)
(same); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA art. 132 (Ombudsman Namib. trans.,
2016) (same); CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA 1991, as republished 2003, art. 152 (Constitutional
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constitutions also now include a large number of rights, including
newer forms of rights like socioeconomic rights and environmental
rights, this can place a substantial obstacle in the way of projects of
constitutional change. Ecuador, for example, contains both one of the
most extensive and creative sets of rights in the world and a provision
stating that any amendment that establishes any restriction to rights
and guarantees must be carried out via constituent assembly rather
than through the basic procedure of constitutional amendment or the
even more demanding procedure of “partial” reform.238 Not all of
these rights can plausibly be understood as part of the democratic
minimum core, but many (such as socioeconomic and environmental
guarantees) can easily be seen as important to thicker conceptions of
democracy.
In particular contexts, these additional reasons for specially en-
trenching certain provisions may have force. The entrenchment of
founding principles or other symbolic issues may help to build a sense
of constitutional identity.239 And entrenching important bargains be-
tween competing political factions may help to stabilize a constitu-
tional order by giving groups assurance that their core interests will be
protected.240 But these forms of entrenchment should be carefully
used. Their main cost is that they can undermine the benefits of flexi-
ble constitutionalism by, for example, preventing needed updating or
giving disproportionate power to judges as updaters. If too much is
placed on the higher tier, a tiered model essentially becomes rigid
constitutionalism. For example, a believer in substantive and par-
ticipatory Concept 1 democracy may think that only the minimum
core electoral provisions associated with Concept 2 electoral democ-
racy should be placed on a higher tier. The remaining provisions, al-
though important, might emerge from a process that is more open to
democratic contestation.241 It is one thing to say that a constitution
Court Rom. trans., 2009) (same); CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE art. 157 (Constitutional Court
Ukr. trans., 2017) (same); ECUADOR CONST. arts. 441, 442, 444 (allowing amendments that es-
tablish restrictions “on rights and guarantees” only by constituent assembly, and not by either of
two lesser methods of constitutional change).
238 See ECUADOR CONST. arts. 441, 442, 444. On the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution’s multi-
tude of rights guarantees, including rights for nature, and the problems rendering them enforcea-
ble, see Mary Elizabeth Whittemore, Comment, The Problem of Enforcing Nature’s Rights
Under Ecuador’s Constitution: Why the 2008 Environmental Amendments Have No Bite, 20 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 659 (2011).
239 See Albert, Expressive Function, supra note 13, at 264.
240 See Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, supra note 13, at 693–98 (noting the motive for
these efforts although noting that they often fail in the long run).
241 As noted by Posner, this participatory process is the essence of Concept 1 democracy at
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should take steps to prevent actors from eroding electoral democracy;
it is another to protect any change to existing rights provisions.242
B. The Choice Between Rules and Standards
Constitutions worldwide adopt two broad models or approaches
to constitutional tiering: one that involves a relatively narrow, rule-
like approach and another that relies on broader, vaguer constitu-
tional standards. One approach is to specifically identify individual
provisions or groups of provisions that are either made completely
unamendable or which require a more restrictive path in order to be
amended. As already noted, for example, a number of constitutions
provide language explicitly prohibiting amendments to provisions pro-
viding for presidential term limits.243 Other constitutions give height-
ened protection to a specifically identified group or set of provisions
found in the text.
Two examples are the German Basic Law, which not only pro-
tects federalism-based principles but also provides that the guarantees
of fundamental rights in Articles One through Twenty of the Basic
Law are unamendable,244 and the South African Constitution, which
singles out particular sections and chapters of the Constitution and
requires that changes to these provisions be carried out through spe-
cial procedures.245 Finally, some constitutions identify classes of provi-
sions and make these classes either more difficult or impossible to
amend. As noted above, for example, some constitutions state that
any rate, since a polity’s values themselves can only emerge from deliberation. POSNER, supra
note 160, at 131.
242 Indeed, recent Ecuadorian experience illustrates the concrete danger with such an ap-
proach. In 2014, the Constitutional Court held that an attempt to remove presidential term limits
could use the lowest tier of change, “amendment.” See Landau, supra note 172. It rooted this
decision in part in an argument that the change would expand the fundamental rights of voters
to choose their leaders and politicians to seek reelection, thus expanding rather than restricting
fundamental rights. Id. In 2017, after a change in presidential administration, the new President,
Lenin Moreno, sought a referendum on whether to reimpose presidential term limits. However,
he faced a credible threat that the Constitutional Court would hold that only a constituent as-
sembly could reimpose term limits since the reimposition might restrict the fundamental rights
expanded by the earlier change. In light of this threat, Moreno used a questionable maneuver to
schedule the referendum and preempt the Constitutional Court’s ruling. See Mauricio Guim &
Augusto Verduga, Ecuador’s “Unstoppable” Constitutional Referendum, I-CONNECT (Dec. 16,
2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/12/ecuadors-unstoppable-constitutional-referendum
[https://perma.cc/9UZZ-P5VH].
243 See supra text accompanying notes 219–22.
244 GG art. 79(3) (Ger.).
245 For example, Section 1 and Chapter 2 of the Constitution are placed on higher tiers and
require special procedures including a higher supermajority (in the former case) and approval by
a certain number of subnational units (in both cases). See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 74.
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any restriction or abolition of rights provisions or “fundamental rights
provisions” are prohibited.246 All of these designs—those that single
out individual provisions, multiple provisions, or classes of provisions
for protection—have a relatively specific and rule-like character.
Other constitutions seek to protect broader, more structural and
standard-like constitutional norms. Constitutions in Chad, East Timor,
and Guinea, for example, all protect the principle of the “separation
of powers” by making it unalterable.247 Other constitutions adopt even
more general, standard-like commitments to preservation of commit-
ments to constitutional democracy. The French Constitution, for in-
stance, provides that the “republican form of government shall not be
the object of any amendment,”248 and the Italian Constitution pro-
vides that the “form of Republic shall not be a matter for constitu-
tional amendment.”249 In the same tradition, the Cameroon
Constitution prohibits amendments “affecting the republican form . . .
of the State”; the Constitution of the Dominican Republic provides
that the “form of government . . . must always be civil, republican,
democratic and representative”; the Gabon Constitution provides that
the “Republican form of the State . . . [is] intangible and cannot be the
object of any revision”; the Senegalese Constitution provides that the
“republican form of the State . . . may not be made the object of a
revision”; and the Tunisian Constitution states that the “system is re-
publican” and that this cannot be amended.250 The Constitution of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo also gives heightened (formally
unamendable) protection to “the principle of universal suffrage” and
“the representative form of Government.”251 At times, tiers of amend-
ment are identified in even broader terms, by referring, for example,
to the “fundamental structure” or “fundamental bases” of the consti-
246 See supra note 237.
247 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD 1996, art. 223; CONSTITUIC¸AO [CONSTI-
TUTION] 2002, art. 156 (Timor-Leste) (Gov’t Timor-Leste trans.); CONSTITUTION OF MAY 7, 2010
art. 154 (Guinea).
248 1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.) (English ed., Constitutional Council Fr. trans., 2013).
249 Art. 139 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (Parliament It. trans., 2014).
250 CONSTITUION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON art. 64 (Afr. Agenda trans., 2008); CON-
STITUCIO´N DE LA REPU´BLICA DOMINICANA art. 268 (Dom. Rep.), translated in WORLD CONSTI-
TUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., Luis Francisco Valle Velasco & J.J. Ruchti trans.,
HeinOnline 2015); CONSTITUCIO´N DE LA REPU´BLICA DE GABO´N art. 117, translated in WORLD
CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., J.J. Ruchti & Maria del Carmen Gress
trans., HeinOnline 2014); LA CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU SENEGAL art. 103, trans-
lated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., J.J. Ruchti trans., HeinOn-
line 2016); CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC art. 1 (U.N. Dev. Programme trans.,
2014).
251 See CONGO CONST. art. 220.
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tution and by requiring changes to that structure to be carried out by
more onerous routes than the default rules of change.252
In prior work, this Article’s authors have argued that the only
truly effective way of addressing the danger of abusive constitutional
change will be via the adoption of some standard-like language of this
kind.253 First, in seeking to define a list of “essential” constitutional
provisions, drafters will inevitably suffer from forms of bounded ra-
tionality, meaning that they cannot foresee the full range of ways in
which democracy or democratic institutions may be attacked in the
future.254 Even if they could foresee all of these ways, experience has
shown that democratic erosion is possible through a large number of
different routes. Any complete list of protected provisions would thus
need to be extremely long, effectively changing the design into a rigid
one.255
The narrower, more rule-like the definition of a “heightened”
constitutional tier, the greater the scope will be for dominant political
actors to work around this list by utilizing other routes that achieve
the same end. Take the example of freedom of speech. One way in
which abusive constitutional actors may seek to restrict or repeal
rights to free speech will be via amendments that directly alter the
scope of guarantees of freedom of expression, possibly by adding
more restrictions or exceptions to the right. But there are a number of
other ways in which a similar end could be achieved. Would-be au-
thoritarian actors could pass constitutional amendments changing the
regulatory or administrative structure for institutions like the media
and universities and use this oversight to weaken the ability of those
institutions to check the government. They could also take constitu-
tional or subconstitutional actions to undermine the independence of
institutions, such as courts, and then use existing legal tools, like defa-
mation suits, to harass opposition speakers. A standard-like principle
would seem to be the only way to evaluate all the different direct and
indirect routes in which norms of free speech could be attacked. Many
other pieces of the democratic minimum core, such as the indepen-
dence of the courts or the fairness of elections, are similarly vulnera-
ble to attack by a number of different means.256
252 See supra note 223 (referring to the Constitutions of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia).
253 Dixon & Landau, supra note 211, at 627–28.
254 See id. at 625.
255 See id. at 626–27 (warning against a “potential adverse impact” standard because it
places too many things on a higher tier of amendment).
256 See Landau, supra note 2, at 259 (noting that in the Hungarian case, several different
routes were taken to undermine the independence of the constitutional and ordinary judiciary).
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This importance of standard-like language is further supported by
recent work by Kim Scheppele that highlights the way in which inter-
action effects between different constitutional changes, rather than
simply individual constitutional changes taken in isolation, can under-
mine the constitutional order.257 As an example, Scheppele looks at
amendments to the previous constitution of Hungary and eventually
its wholesale replacement. Scheppele labels Hungary as a “Franken-
state.”258 She notes that when challenged on the changes to its Consti-
tution, the ruling party argued that each of the individual components
(changes to the jurisdiction of courts and selection of judges, for ex-
ample, or gerrymandering) were found in other democratic constitu-
tional orders (the United States, for example, in the case of severe
gerrymandering).259 Within these other orders, the provisions might be
problematic but would not necessarily take the country outside the
bounds of liberal democracy. But Scheppele argues that the combina-
tion of these programs has been devastating for electoral democracy
in Hungary, making the ruling party very difficult to dislodge while
greatly weakening checks on its authority.260 The risk of rule-like lan-
guage in this context is that a series of individual changes might pass
muster under the rules, but the combination of changes may amount
to a substantial democratic erosion. Although no constitutional design
can easily deal with this difficult problem, a standard-like approach
rather than a checklist of rules seems to offer the most hope because
such an approach will more easily detect the overall effect of a pack-
age of changes.261
Rule-like and standard-like approaches are not mutually exclu-
sive, and, in many contexts, it will be a good idea to use both. Thus,
standard-like language can be combined with heightened entrench-
ment for certain select rule-like requirements that have been proven
through experience to be particularly problematic—such as a given set
of presidential or congressional term limits or perhaps the rules gov-
erning selection or jurisdiction of the courts.262 This rule-like language
257 Kim Lane Scheppele, The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checkl-
ists Do Not Work, 26 GOVERNANCE 559 (2013).
258 Id. at 560.
259 Id. at 561 (“Each law was clearly vetted so that its Fidesz defenders could say that there
was some law just like it somewhere in Europe.”).
260 Id.
261 See id. at 562 (calling for a shift in evaluations of the rule of law from a checklist-based
approach to a more holistic approach); Dixon & Landau, supra note 211, at 625–26 (arguing that
a narrow approach to protecting certain democratic provisions can easily be evaded).
262 See supra text accompanying notes 208–10.
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itself may have important advantages in some contexts. Clearer and
more specific language may require less judicial interpretation and
thus be more susceptible to political forms of enforcement.263 In the
context of an attempt to abolish term limits, for example, opposition
political groups might more easily mobilize around provisions that
clearly prohibit amendment of a one-term presidential limit than they
will around more ambiguous provisions protecting the “fundamental
structure,” “separation of powers,” or “republican form of govern-
ment.” In many contexts where abusive acts of constitutional change
are being carried out, judicial independence is problematic and courts
are under immense political pressure.264 In these contexts, political en-
forcement may have a more realistic chance of working than resort to
the courts. Moreover, clearer and more rule-like restrictions may also
help to increase certainty during periods of institutional contestation,
thus helping to facilitate a smooth transition.265
C. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Protection
An important aspect of constitutional design (envisioned
broadly) in this area is the extent to which it is carried out not only ex
ante by constitutional designers during constitution-making processes,
but also ex post by judges seeking to defend the constitutional order
against constitutional change.
The language taken from a large number of constitutions in the
prior two Sections demonstrates the ex ante approach—constitutional
designers have often included textual language in constitutions to ei-
ther make some kinds of constitutional change impossible (absent
wholesale replacement) or to require a more demanding procedure to
bring it about.266 Of course, even where this language is explicit, there
may be questions about its justiciability, or amenability to decision by
the courts. However, designers sometimes can and do remove doubt
on this point by including a provision giving the judiciary the power to
determine which route a given project of constitutional change must
take.267
In some cases, courts have developed doctrines that have effec-
tively created tiered systems of constitutional change even absent ex-
263 See infra Section VI.B.
264 See infra Section VI.A.
265 See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game
Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 248–49 (2009).
266 See supra Section V.A.
267 See, e.g., ECUADOR CONST. art. 443 (“The Constitutional Court shall rule which of the
procedures provided for in the present chapter pertains to each case.”).
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plicit constitutional language clearly creating tiers.268 India and
Colombia, both very widely studied systems, are good examples.269
The Indian Constitution contains only a relatively weak version of tex-
tual tiering to protect federalism and does not include an explicit limit
on the amending power (indeed politicians later added language ex-
plicitly denying the existence of any such limit), but the SCI, after first
settling on a position that fundamental rights could not be restricted at
all, has subsequently settled on a position preventing any change to
the “basic structure” of the Constitution.270 The Colombian Constitu-
tional Court, likewise, and despite a constitutional text seeming to
give the Court power to review amendments only for procedural er-
rors in passage,271 has held that the amendment power cannot be used
to undertake “a substitution of the constitution,” or, in other words, to
replace partially or completely any of its defining principles.272
The justifications for these judge-made doctrines, both in these
countries and elsewhere, vary widely. Sometimes, the argument is that
the constitution implicitly sets up a form of tiering. The Colombian
Constitution, for example, discusses the possibility of holding a con-
stituent assembly, but it does not say that certain forms of change
must be carried out using this route.273 The Court has held that the
possibility of a constituent assembly should be read to imply that cer-
tain forms of change are equivalent to replacing rather than amending
the Constitution and that these forms of change should be reserved to
the people using their “original constituent power” through a constitu-
ent assembly rather than to the “derivative constituent power,” which
is exercised by governmental institutions acting through ordinary
mechanisms of reform.274 In effect, the Court is reading the Constitu-
tion to create a crude division between the mechanisms of ordinary
268 See generally Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migra-
tion and Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 657 (2013) (tracing the spread of
the doctrine to a number of countries in different regions).
269 For a detailed overview and comparison of the positive and negative experiences of the
use of the doctrine in each system, see Dixon & Landau, supra note 211, at 614–23.
270 See INDIA CONST. art. 368; Bharati v. Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 985 (India).
271 See C.P. art. 241 (Colom.) (giving the Constitutional Court the power to rule on pro-
posed constitutional amendments “only for errors of procedure”).
272 See CEPEDA ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 113, at 341 (discussing C.C., julio 9, 2003,
Montealegre Lynett, J., Sentencia C-551/03 (Colom.)).
273 C.P. arts. 374, 376 (Colom.).
274 See CEPEDA ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 113, at 341; see also Carlos Bernal, Un-
constitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia: An Analysis of the
Justification and Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement Doctrine, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 339,
342–44, 347–50 (2013) (explaining and critiquing this theoretical approach).
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amendment, for example approval by a relative and then absolute ma-
jority of Congress in two separate legislative sessions,275 and changes
to fundamental constitutional principles, which can only be carried
out by constituent assembly. An alternative but related possibility is
that the very notion of constitutional “amendment,” as opposed to
replacement, implies limits on the degree of constitutional change that
will be carried out by such a mechanism.
Within the particular contexts of India and Colombia, these
judge-made doctrines have been useful in stabilizing constitutional
text, increasing identification of core constitutional principles, and
preventing abusive forms of constitutional change.276 In both of these
cases, the doctrines arguably emerged because of constitutional de-
signs that made the mechanisms of constitutional change too flexible
in light of their political context.277 In Colombia, approval by majori-
ties in two legislative sessions was fairly difficult in the fragmented
political context just after approval of the 1991 Constitution, but it
became extremely easy during the presidency of Alvaro Uribe, who
benefitted from a high approval rating and a strong congressional coa-
lition.278 Uribe could easily garner sufficient votes to approve amend-
ments extending his term, first in 2006 and again in 2010.279 The Indian
Constitution, as noted above, does contain a tiered approach to
amendment, which is designed to give special protection or entrench-
ment to certain federalism-based constitutional principles.280 But the
scheme created by the Constitution, which allowed most amendments
to be carried out by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting
in Parliament, also turned out to be too permissive in a context in
which a single political party, the Congress Party, historically domi-
nated the political systems. For example, this system was too permis-
sive of most forms of amendment to guard against the danger of
abusive constitutional change by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi before
and during her “Emergency” (1975 to 1977), in which she jailed politi-
cal opponents and attacked the courts.281 The decision of the SCI to
imply a basic structure doctrine could thus be seen in part as a re-
275 See C.P. art. 375 (Colom.).
276 See Dixon & Landau, supra note 211, at 614–15.
277 Id.
278 See id. at 615–16.
279 See id.
280 See INDIA CONST. art. 368.
281 See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 98, at 492–95 (exploring the attempts by Gandhi to at-
tack the courts in the 1970s and judicial responses).
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sponse to the weakness of the initial design of the Indian constitu-
tional amendment procedure.
But at the same time, wholly judge-made doctrines like these are
second-best responses to contexts where the constitutional design oth-
erwise gives judges and political actors no effective avenue for block-
ing abusive exercises of constitutional change.282 The first-best
response is likely ex ante textual language in the constitution itself,
rather than a wholly judge-made doctrine. This is first because rela-
tively few courts are likely to imply such a power (and are even less
likely to deploy it in significant cases) when there is no clear textual
source for their authority in the constitution. The high courts of India
and Colombia, for example, are each widely considered among the
most activist tribunals in the world and have a distinctive conception
of roles based on distrust of the political system.283 Outside of these
contexts, judicial construction and use of the doctrine becomes less
likely.
Even if judges do derive such a doctrine, their legitimacy in using
it may suffer because of the absence of explicit textual authority for
their rulings. This is particularly important because the doctrine is
likely to be most important in cases that are politically charged and
which will involve powerful political leaders seeking to push through
constitutional changes. For example, in a well-known 2011 case, the
Hungarian Constitutional Court was petitioned but refused to derive
an unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine to block
changes proposed by the ruling party of Hungary that greatly re-
stricted the Court’s jurisdiction by taking away its ability to review
fiscal matters.284 The Court held that such limits on the power of con-
stitutional amendment might exist but that it would generally be be-
yond the authority of the Court to identify or deploy them given the
existing constitutional text.285 While critics have viewed the decision as
282 On theories of the second best, see generally, P. Bohm, On the Theory of “Second Best,”
34 REV. ECON. STUD. 301 (1967); Otto A. Davis & Andrew B. Whinston, Welfare Economics
and the Theory of Second Best, 32 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1965); R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster,
The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956); M. McManus, Comments
on the General Theory of Second Best, 26 REV. ECON. STUD. 209 (1959).
283 See David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional
Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319, 327–28, 343 (2010) (on Colombia); Nick Robinson, Expanding
Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 1, 3, 12–14, 66–67 (2009) (on India).
284 See Halmai, supra note 164, at 191–99.
285 See id. at 195–96.
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a part of the story of erosion of democracy in Hungary,286 the Court
would plausibly have been more willing to strike down the amend-
ments if the existing Hungarian Constitution had given it clearer au-
thority to do so. Indeed, the Court explicitly relied on the absence of
any “eternity clause” or other form of tiering in the Hungarian Consti-
tution as a justification for its decision.287
Finally, we note that a judge-made doctrine is likely only going to
be able to create a fairly crude form of tiering. In both Colombia and
India, the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine creates
a simple division between most changes, which can be carried out us-
ing ordinary amendment mechanisms, and changes to the “basic struc-
ture” or “fundamental principles,” which would appear to require
wholesale constitutional replacement. One could plausibly question
whether this is the best way to calibrate the procedural differences
between tiers. It may be, for example, that the higher tier should be
protected by higher supermajority requirements or other procedural
devices like temporal gaps between votes rather than by requiring
complete constitutional replacement. Courts generally lack the juris-
prudential resources to impose these procedural requirements unless
they are explicit in the text.288
D. The Nature and Number of Constitutional Tiers
Constitutions with tiered constitutional designs demonstrate a
number of different approaches to the design of these tiers. A signifi-
cant number of constitutions simply include eternity clauses and state
that these provisions or parts of the document may not be changed.289
These eternity clauses may be targeted at specific provisions (as with
presidential reelection in Honduras),290 directed at a large number of
provisions (as with the number of African and Latin American consti-
286 See, e.g., id. at 191–99 (arguing that decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court
have led to a lack of power of judicial review necessary to check the political branches).
287 See id. at 195.
288 The most plausible exception is adding a referendum requirement as part of a process of
fundamental constitutional change since, like a constituent assembly, this could be justified
through arguments concerning the power of the people or “constituent power” in making funda-
mental constitutional decisions. Cf. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision
No. 62-20DC, Nov. 6, 1962, Rec. 27 (Fr.) (refusing to use existing constitutional rules to invali-
date a referendum on whether to amend the French Constitution and allow direct presidential
reelection because the referendum was a direct expression of national sovereignty).
289 For examples, see supra notes 244–52; Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, supra note 13,
at 665–66.
290 See HONDURAS CONST. art. 374 (stating that the articles referring to the “presidential
term” and “the prohibition to be again President of the Republic” may not be amended).
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tutions that prohibit restrictions on constitutional rights),291 or aimed
at broader principles like human dignity, federalism, or the separation
of powers (as in Germany and Brazil).292 The eternity clause may send
the strongest possible signal about the identity of a given constitution,
which is likely why it was used in Germany after World War II.293 At
the same time, the existence of an eternity clause raises difficult philo-
sophical and interpretive questions. The most pressing is whether such
a clause can be changed through a process of wholesale constitutional
replacement or is unchangeable even through that means.
Whatever the philosophical answer to this question may be, its
existence may create a problematic ambiguity. A prominent example
stems from the presidency of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras. Zelaya, a
populist leader allied with Hugo Chavez, sought to hold a nonbinding
poll on whether to replace the Honduran Constitution of 1982.294 One
of the core legal arguments marshalled by opponents was that the real
intent of Zelaya was to change the eternity clause found in the ex-
isting Constitution that prohibited any presidential reelection so that
he could remain in power.295 Zelaya and his allies never explicitly
stated that this was his intent, but they also at times responded with
arguments that the democratic process had to allow some process
through which fundamental constitutional changes could be made.296
The process ended with Zelaya’s removal in a military coup and Hon-
duras’s consequent suspension from the Organization of American
States. Arguably, the eternity clause played some role in building mu-
tual frustration rather than creating some process for potential change
that contending parties could agree upon.297 The Honduran example
291 See supra text accompanying note 237.
292 See C.F. art. 60(4) (Braz.); GG art. 79(3) (Ger.).
293 For a discussion of the importance of this entrenchment, particularly of the human dig-
nity clause, see DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRU-
DENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 42–45 (3d ed. 2012).
294 See NOAH FELDMAN, DAVID LANDAU, BRIAN SHEPPARD & LEONIDAS ROSA SUAZO,
REPORT TO THE COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION OF HONDURAS: CONSTITU-
TIONAL ISSUES 10–22 (Mar. 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1915214
[https://perma.cc/7PP4-42H6] (giving the factual background to the controversy).
295 See id. at 11, 30.
296 See id. at 38 (noting that Zelaya never expressly stated he intended to change the no
reelection clause); see also Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, supra note 13, at 692–93 (critiquing
the eternity clause as “handcuffing” prospects for constitutional change).
297 A role was also played by Article 239 of the Honduran Constitution, which stated that
those seeking to change the no-reelection ban would “cease” to hold office and be barred for a
period of ten years. See HONDURAS CONST. art. 239; Dixon & Jackson, supra note 131, at 175–78
(noting the ambiguity that Article 239 created in the Honduran crisis).
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of course does not suggest that eternity clauses should never be used,
but it does suggest some cautions regarding their use.
This ambiguity can be removed through another constitutional
design in which some parts of the constitution are explicitly made
unamendable except via a constituent assembly.298 This design still
raises some difficult questions. Albert argues, for example, that this
design makes it too difficult for democratic forces to seek constitu-
tional change.299 Given that—at least in this Article’s proposal—the
main target of constitutional tiering will be the democratic minimum
core, this objection may not bite as deeply.300 Even extraordinary re-
strictions on constitutional change may be justifiable in the name of
democracy if the purpose and effect of those restrictions is to defend
democracy itself. Still, from a pragmatic perspective, forcing a signifi-
cant number of constitutional changes to be carried out only through
constitutional replacement may overincentivize the often destabilizing
process of constitution-making, forfeiting one of the benefits of a flex-
ible system of constitutional change.
Thus, in many contexts, the ideal response may be one in which a
constitution contains multiple tiers short of replacement rather than
making the second-tier replacement itself. These tiers will differ in
terms of the supermajorities or other processes required for change—
a topic treated in more depth just below. Constitutions also vary
widely in terms of the number of tiers they contain. Some constitu-
tions, for instance, simply adopt a higher tier and a lower tier, like
amendment and revision in California and other U.S. states;301 others
contain two such tiers plus constitutional replacement, as in Venezuela
and Ecuador.302 Still others adopt a larger number of different tracks
for amendment based on the subject matter of a given change.303
298 See ECUADOR CONST. arts. 441–444 (making restrictions on “rights and guarantees,”
and changes to the constitutional amendment rule itself, only achievable by constituent
assembly).
299 See Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, supra note 13, at 698 (arguing that because of
democratic values, eternity clauses should be replaced with an “entrenchment simulator,” where
provisions are made impossible to change for some period of time and then placed on a higher
tier).
300 See supra Section V.A.
301 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVIII.
302 Each constitution distinguishes amendment from one higher tier of constitutional
change, called “constitutional reform” in Venezuela and “partial” reform in Ecuador. See, e.g.,
ECUADOR CONST. arts. 441–444; VENEZUELA CONST. arts. 340–349; supra text accompanying
notes 43–48.
303 See, e.g., Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11,
§§ 38–45 (U.K.); supra text accompanying notes 31–35.
 498 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:438
A focus on the democratic minimum core suggests that it may be
desirable to have a relatively few tiers, such as two in addition to re-
placement, rather than a large number. The higher tier might protect
those changes that threaten the democratic minimum core, while the
other tier acts as the default for ordinary constitutional change. As
noted earlier, the minimum core can be attacked in a number of dif-
ferent ways, and it makes sense to protect all such routes.304 At the
same time, creating a large number of additional tiers for different
subjects may threaten to ossify too much of the constitution, thereby
losing some of the benefits of flexibility. Furthermore, it may be that a
simplified system of constitutional change provides higher expressive
or identity-based benefits, given that a more complex system may be
more difficult for citizens to comprehend.
E. The Procedural Differences Between Constitutional Tiers
In constructing different tiers of amendment, constitutional draft-
ers can use a range of different tools.305 Perhaps most obviously, they
can rely on heightened legislative supermajority requirements for the
proposal or approval of amendments. They can also distinguish higher
tiers by including additional institutional veto points, such as by re-
quiring approval of second chambers of legislatures or approval in a
popular referendum.306 Finally, designers can include rules requiring
that approval of some amendments be considered separately from
other changes (single subject requirements) or that they take more
time by, for example, demanding that amendments be passed in sepa-
rate votes in multiple legislative sessions or within an intervening elec-
tion.307 We treat these possibilities in turn. One preliminary point:
higher tiers, in theory, should be more difficult to amend than lower
tiers. But given the complexity of constitutional amendment rules,
there are examples from comparative constitutionalism where this cri-
terion is not unambiguously met. In Ecuador, for example, change to
provisions within the lowest “amendment” tier can be done by Con-
304 See supra Section V.B.
305 Some existing empirical work suggests that there are limits to the extent to which
amendment rates are sensitive to differences in amendment rules. See Ginsburg & Melton, supra
note 4, at 90. This work indicates that other factors, such as a country’s past experience with
amendment, or “amendment culture,” may play a more significant role. See id. However, this
work has not specifically measured the impact of amendment rules on particular types of change,
such as those impacting the democratic minimum core. See Dixon & Landau, Democratic Mini-
mum Core, supra note 190, at 285.
306 Dixon, supra note 8, at 104–08.
307 See id. at 105–08.
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gress alone through a two-thirds vote; the higher “partial” reform tier
requires a referendum but can also apparently be passed by a simple
majority in Congress.308
1. Heightened Supermajorities
Perhaps most commonly, higher tiers of amendment can be pro-
tected through increased requirements of legislative approval. For ex-
ample, the default rule for amendments might be a simple or absolute
majority, while some amendments might require two-thirds approval.
Or ordinary amendments might be approved with a two-thirds vote of
a parliament, while others may require a seventy-five percent thresh-
old. The appeal of these kinds of rules is obvious: they make it easy to
measure and adjust levels of difficulty.
However, overreliance on these rules is problematic, primarily
because it can be very difficult for constitutional designers to deter-
mine ex ante how challenging various thresholds of change will actu-
ally prove to be. Supermajority thresholds are very sensitive to the
distribution of political power and particularly to the shape of the
party system and its interaction with electoral rules. The fragmenta-
tion of parties plays an obvious role here—where a country has two or
more strong parties, a two-thirds or three-quarters threshold may re-
quire something close to consensus between competing political
movements. In contrast, in a dominant party system like the ones
found in South Africa and in India for much of its history, where one
party controls most political power, a two-thirds threshold (or one
even higher) can often be cleared without the need for any negotia-
tion with other political forces.309 Dominant political parties also may
have less to fear in terms of future electoral repercussions if they sup-
port forms of constitutional change that end up being deeply unpopu-
lar with the electorate. Dominant political parties may face so little
meaningful electoral competition that their members do not fear los-
ing office even where they take unpopular actions.310
308 See ECUADOR CONST. arts. 441–442.
309 See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, “He Had a Mandate”: The South African Constitutional Court
and the African National Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy, 2 CONST. CT. REV. 1, 44
(2009) (S. Afr.); Rosalind Dixon & Adrienne Stone, Constitutional Amendment and Political
Constitutionalism: A Philosophical and Comparative Reflection, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 95, 108 (David Dyzenhaus & Malcolm Thornburn eds., 2016)
(discussing the Congress Party in India).
310 See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA
OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 135 (2015).
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The strength of political parties also plays a role. In a competitive
system with several strong parties and a tradition of party discipline, it
should be difficult for a political leader or movement to gain
supermajority support for a particular proposed constitutional change
without also persuading several of the heads of major parties (includ-
ing opposition parties) to support the change.311 Strong and stable po-
litical parties may be particularly unlikely to support changes to a
constitution that have the capacity to adversely impact their electoral
prospects in the future. However, where parties are weaker or less
institutionalized and disciplined, it may be easier for a dominant indi-
vidual political leader to gain supermajority support for a particular
amendment. If the leader in question is charismatic and popular, he
may be able to persuade individual legislators to support a proposed
change through the use of incentives such as patronage.312 Individual
legislators may have shorter time horizons than strong political par-
ties, and their political commitments with which a proposed amend-
ment could conflict may be less developed.
The broad point, then, is that the functioning of supermajority
rules depends heavily on the details of political context. This context is
not fixed—it often changes after a constitution is written as, for exam-
ple, old parties die and new parties are born, support for historically
hegemonic political forces erodes because of corruption or other fac-
tors, and electoral laws are changed. From the standpoint of constitu-
tional designers, this makes it difficult to predict the effect of different
supermajority thresholds when they will be needed most.
2. Referendums and Institutional Veto Points
A second design adds additional procedural requirements for
changes placed on a higher tier of amendment, beyond those existing
on the default tier. For example, some federal constitutions require
that changes directly affecting the interests of subnational units also
be approved by the upper  house of their federal legislature, while
ordinary amendments must only be approved by the lower house.313
These kinds of requirements may be useful for particular functional
purposes, but they are probably of relatively little use in checking abu-
311 See Dixon & Stone, supra note 309, at 107–08 (giving as examples the United States and
the United Kingdom).
312 See Landau, supra note 283, at 335–36 (discussing these problems of weak party systems
in the context of Colombia).
313 See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 74 (requiring that the upper house of Parliament, the
National Council of Provinces, be involved in approving some classes of constitutional change).
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sive acts of constitutional change. This is particularly true where, as is
often the case, these upper chambers have traditions of deference
rather than equal partnership within the political system.
One common design worth more careful study is to add a referen-
dum requirement for certain constitutional changes. This requirement
seems to correspond to a logic that is consistent with the general con-
tours of constituent power theory—more fundamental political deci-
sions, such as those involving the higher tier, should be made with
input from the people. The risks of this form of popular involvement
in constitutional change are especially clear in the context of feared
democratic erosion: the same powerful leaders or movements seeking
these changes may be able to manipulate the popular will so as to gain
support for their proposals.
However, comparative evidence suggests that, at times, referen-
dums do slow or stop problematic projects of constitutional change.
For example, in 2000, voters in Zimbabwe rejected a constitution pro-
posed by President Mugabe with potentially antidemocratic effects in
a range of areas.314 And in several recent Latin American cases, refer-
endums have played a major role in limiting presidents from seeking
extensions or abolition of term limits. In 2007, voters in Venezuela
rejected a series of constitutional reforms proposed by President Cha-
vez, including the abolition of term limits and sweeping institutional
changes—although, two years later, they approved a narrower set of
reforms eliminating term limits alone.315 In 2016, voters in Bolivia also
rejected an attempt by President Morales to seek a fourth term in
office (he has been in power since 2006).316 And in Ecuador, the oppo-
sition to President Correa sought to have his proposal eliminating
term limits placed on the higher tier of “partial” reform rather than
the lower tier of “amendment” because they felt they might be able to
win that referendum.317 They failed in this effort when the Constitu-
tional Court held that the “amendment” tier could be used, allowing
unilateral approval by the Correa-controlled Congress.318 However,
Correa’s successor Lenin Moreno held a 2018 referendum on whether
to reimpose term limits, and the populace voted overwhelmingly in
favor of doing so.319
314 See John Hatchard, Some Lessons on Constitution-Making from Zimbabwe, 45 J. AFR.
L. 210, 214–15 (2001) (U.K.).
315 See JAVIER CORRALES & MICHAEL PENFOLD, DRAGON IN THE TROPICS 34–39 (2011).
316 See generally Casey, supra note 173.
317 See generally Landau, supra note 172.
318 See id. (discussing the opposition strategy).
319 See Maggy Ayala & Marcelo Rochabru´n, Ecuador Votes to Bring Back Presidential
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The utility of referendums in these cases may stem from voters’
ability to sniff out forms of political change that, although issued in
the name of the people, are in fact highly elite driven. In the term
limits cases mentioned above, for example, it is notable that highly
popular presidents like Chavez and Morales could lose referendums—
they were personally popular, but their proposals to remain in office
indefinitely were not.320 All of this suggests that it would likely be a
mistake to rely on referendums as the sole protection for a higher
tier.321 But they may be very useful as an additional protection.
3. Single Subject Requirements
Constitutions can provide that either all changes or those on
higher tiers must treat only a single subject per amendment.322 For
abusive forms of constitutional change in particular, a single subject
rule—or a requirement that amendments be passed one by one, rather
than in a bundle, may have particularly significant effects. One of the
key tactics of abusive constitutional actors is to bundle antidemocratic
forms of constitutional change with more democratic ones; by doing
so, they often hope to confuse voters as to the true democratic charac-
ter of proposed amendments.323 They also often hope to “buy” the
support of potential opponents. There are thus persuasive, although
empirically untested, reasons for thinking that a single subject rule
may help defeat certain forms of abusive constitutional change.
4. Temporal Limitations
Finally, and with notable exceptions, existing scholarship has
overlooked the potential of temporal limitations as a source of rein-
forced protection for certain forms of constitutional change.324 Yet
some constitutions do provide that amendments must be passed in
Term Limits, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/world/americas/
ecuador-presidential-term-limits.html [https://perma.cc/3BJB-ZTSS].
320 See generally CORRALES & PENFOLD, supra note 315; Casey, supra note 173.
321 Of course, constitutions can also increase the participation thresholds or voting thresh-
olds needed for a successful referendum on the higher tiers, thereby giving the device more of a
supermajoritarian rather than majoritarian character. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e) (re-
quiring that proposed amendments or revisions be approved by sixty percent of voters in a
referendum).
322 See, e.g., id. art. XI, § 3 (requiring that popular initiative aiming to amend the constitu-
tion encompass “but one subject and matter directly connected therewith”).
323 See Dixon & Landau, supra note 211, at 625.
324 See Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, supra note 13, at 711–12 (calling for rules that
require citizens to approve amendments by multiple votes, separated by time lapses).
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multiple legislative sessions.325 Others provide that amendments re-
quire multiple legislatives votes with an intervening election326 or that
amendments only be carried out at certain intervals.327 Rules requiring
time lapses, or, even better, multiple elections between votes on con-
stitutional changes, may be especially beneficial when considering
amendments that may have an antidemocratic or destabilizing effect.
This is because the forces seeking such changes often attempt to mo-
bilize temporary majorities in order to expand and extend their
power; temporal limits on amendment may slow amendments enough
so that they do not come into effect before these forces lose power.
And as Bruce Ackerman suggests with respect to the United States,
repeated and sustained majorities in favor of substantial constitutional
changes, with intervening elections, help to demonstrate durable
rather than transient support for those changes.328 This suggests that it
may be worthwhile to consider placing temporal restrictions on partic-
ularly sensitive tiers of amendment.
VI. TIERING IN ACTION
This Article so far has made a normative case for a hybrid or
tiered design of constitutional design, as opposed to a purely flexible
or rigid design. It has also explored the architecture of a tiered consti-
tutional design. This Part gives some thought to how tiered constitu-
tional designs function in practice. The main conclusion is that while
enforcement is of course difficult and in any case imperfect, these de-
signs have promise as a control of problematic exercises of constitu-
tional change in various circumstances, and there are ways for both
designers and enforcers (such as judges) to improve their effective-
ness. The goal must not be perfect enforcement, but rather sufficient
enforcement or threat of enforcement to act as a speed bump that
slows some destabilizing or antidemocratic projects of constitutional
change and which deters others from being carried out by political
actors in the first place.
325 E.g., C.P. art. 375 (Colom.) (requiring that constitutional amendments be approved by
both houses of Congress in two separate sessions).
326 E.g., 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 110 (Greece) (Kostas Mavrias & Epami-
nondas Spiliotopoulos eds., Xenophon Paparrigopoulos & Stavroula Vassilouni trans., Hellenic
Parliament trans., 2008) (requiring that amendments be proposed by one Parliament and voted
on and adopted by another).
327 See id. (forbidding constitutional change within five years of a previous change).
328 See ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 285–88.
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A. Judicial Enforcement and Transnational Anchoring
The enforcement of tiered constitutional language often depends
heavily on judges, who are charged with interpreting clauses in order
to determine whether a given project or change falls on a lower or
higher tier. In contexts where powerful political actors are proposing
potentially destabilizing and antidemocratic constitutional changes,
this will not be an easy task. The same political actors who propose
these changes may also attempt to pressure or pack the courts that
will be ruling on their proposals.
Design is relevant in these contexts. As noted above, one reason
for preferring ex ante language creating constitutional tiers is that
judges working with such language may have more authority and
grounding to enforce limits on constitutional amendment.329 But, of
course, the independence of a court and its sense of judicial role will
also be important.
A comparison between two Latin American countries with recent
efforts to extend term limits may demonstrate the point. The Colom-
bian Constitution does not have a clear system of tiers, nor does the
Court have any clear authority to review constitutional amendments
for anything other than procedural errors in their passage.330 Nonethe-
less, the Court used its previously constructed version of the unconsti-
tutional constitutional amendment doctrine to strike down a proposed
referendum on a constitutional amendment that would have allowed
President Uribe to seek a third consecutive term in office.331 In effect,
the Court held that the proposed amendment impacted core principles
of the existing Colombian Constitution and that such a change could
only be carried out by a constituent assembly.332 This decision is cele-
brated because of its impact in preventing a potential democratic ero-
sion in Colombia; Uribe accepted the Court’s decision and announced
that he would not run for reelection.333
In contrast, the Ecuadorian Constitution includes a carefully cali-
brated scheme of constitutional tiers, which requires that any change
to the “fundamental structure” or restriction on fundamental rights be
329 See supra Section V.C.
330 C.P. art. 241(1) (Colom.) (giving the Constitutional Court the power to review laws
amending the constitution, of whatever origin, only for procedural errors in their formation).
331 See CEPEDA ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 113, at 352 (discussing C.C., febrero 26,
2010, Sierra Porto, J., Sentencia C-141/10 (Colom.)).
332 See id. at 353.
333 See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 310, at 148 (arguing that “the [Colombian] constitutional
court emerged as the sole check on the prospect of increasingly unilateral executive power”).
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carried out through more demanding procedures of reform.334 Fur-
thermore, the Constitutional Court of Ecuador is textually required to
determine which of the tiers is the correct path for any given constitu-
tional change.335 When President Correa presented his proposal
wholly eliminating presidential term limits, the opposition offered the
Court very strong arguments that such a change surely impacted the
“basic structure” of the Constitution and plausibly also imposed a
“constraint on constitutional rights and guarantees.”336 Thus, at a min-
imum, designers should have followed the more demanding “partial”
reform path, which would have required a referendum in addition to
congressional approval, rather than the default “amendment” path.337
If the change also restricted constitutional rights, the change would
have been impossible except via constituent assembly.338 Yet the
Court brushed aside these arguments and issued a decision allowing
Correa to use the amendment route, thus avoiding a potentially prob-
lematic referendum.339
The constitutional design gave the opposition more ammunition
in the Ecuadorian case; nonetheless, a number of factors in the politi-
cal and judicial context made enforcement more likely in the Colom-
bian case. Uribe was a powerful and popular politician, but he
presided over a diverse coalition, and the Colombian Constitutional
Court, in particular, maintained independence and had a long history
of judicial activism. In Ecuador, in contrast, Correa had established a
far higher degree of control over all state institutions, including the
judiciary.340
In cases like Ecuador, where courts are controlled by the execu-
tive, judicial enforcement is unlikely to be a promising route. In many
contexts, however, enforcement is more possible, but courts face sig-
nificant political pressure. In these contexts, courts may be able to
334 ECUADOR CONST. arts. 441, 442, 444.
335 See id. art. 443.
336 Id. art. 442; see, e.g., Carlos Bernal Pulido, There Are Still Judges in Berlin: On the
Proposal to Amend the Ecuadorian Constitution to Allow Indefinite Presidential Reelection,
I-CONNECT (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2014/09/there-are-still-judges-in-
berlin-on-the-proposal-to-amend-the-ecuadorian-constitution-to-allow-indefinite-presidential-
reelection/ [https://perma.cc/DQH4-LFHN].
337 See ECUADOR CONST. art. 441.
338 See id. art. 444.
339 See Carolina Silva-Portero, Chronicle of an Amendment Foretold: Eliminating Presiden-
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increase both the stability and effectiveness of a tiered approach to
constitutional amendment by anchoring the content of different tiers
in a comparative analysis of evolving global or comparative constitu-
tional practice.341 In other words, the notion of a constitutional demo-
cratic minimum core can be tied to an overlapping consensus among
democratic countries’ constitutional and legal practices.342 Constitu-
tional drafters, in some cases, may also be able to encourage this
approach by directing courts to consider comparative practices in in-
terpreting the meaning of their constitutional amendment
provisions.343
By considering whether the particular constitutional arrange-
ments under attack are present in a large number of other constitu-
tional democracies, a court will often gain a clearer sense of whether
such arrangements are fundamental to the democratic minimum core
that should be placed on the higher tier.344 In many contexts, it can
also provide them with an additional source of legitimacy in interpret-
ing those requirements since they can bolster their decisions by point-
ing to other systems where similar changes have been viewed as a
threat to democracy. Global constitutional norms do not have the
same normative force or appeal in every constitutional context. In
some cases, dominant political actors may in fact explicitly reject
global approaches as neocolonial or imperialist in nature and insist on
a wholly nationalist approach to constitutional change.345 Even in
those contexts, a court can look to transnational practice as a source,
while couching its decision in more local terms. But in many other
cases, legal and political elites will view global norms and practices as
a relevant guide to behavior. In those contexts, a court that cites these
practices will also gain an important additional source of perceived
legitimacy for any decision to require a higher, more demanding set of
requirements for formal constitutional change. Instead of being seen
as enforcing a purely domestic or subjective conception of democracy,
341 See Dixon & Landau, supra note 211; see also Lech Garlicki & Zofia V. Garlicka, Exter-
nal Review of Constitutional Amendments? International Law as a Norm of Reference, 44 ISR. L.
REV. 343 (2011) (Isr.) (proposing that international law be used to help build theories of
unamendability).
342 See supra Section V.A.
343 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 36(1) (requiring courts to consider international law, and
authorizing them to consider comparative or foreign law, in the process of interpreting the bill of
rights).
344 See Landau & Dixon, supra note 123, at 879.
345 For additional discussion of contexts where references to international or transnational
norms will likely backfire, see id. (discussing examples of nationalist approaches to constitutional
change from Venezuela and Zimbabwe).
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a court will be perceived by an important audience as enforcing a
more objective, widely shared set of democratic constitutional
understandings.
The Colombian Constitutional Court in fact bolstered its decision
that Uribe’s proposed term-limit change was an unconstitutional con-
stitutional amendment with an extensive reference to transnational
practice. Based on a comparative survey, it found that allowance of
more than two four-year presidential terms was highly unusual both in
regional and broader comparative practice with respect to pure presi-
dential systems and, further, that such a system was viewed by legal
and political science scholars as giving a problematic degree of power
to the president.346 This conclusion increased the Court’s confidence,
based on its domestic historical and institutional analysis, that allow-
ance of three four-year presidential terms would cause unacceptable
distortion to the separation of powers. The Colombian Court’s deci-
sion stands as an example of judicial use of transnational anchoring to
bolster the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking on threats to the
democratic minimum core.
B. Popular Enforcement and Constitutional Language
Given the challenges associated with judicial enforcement of lim-
its on amendment in many common circumstances, constitutional de-
signers and scholars should also be attuned to the possibility of
nonjudicial routes through which amendment tiers might gain force.
In some cases, opposition groups may mobilize around language
prohibiting certain forms of constitutional change; in other cases, the
threat of such mobilization may deter actors from carrying out such
projects.
Ecuador again presents a fascinating recent example. While the
Ecuadorian Constitutional Court played virtually no role in impeding
Correa’s project, his project did cause a major public backlash, crystal-
lized in a series of massive protests.347 In a Congress over which he
had firm control, the outcry was sufficient to force a major change to
the project—presidential term limits were eliminated, but this change
would come into effect only after the 2017 election, forcing Correa to
346 See CEPEDA ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 113, at 354–55 (discussing C.C., febrero
26, 2010, Sierra Porto, J., Sentencia C-141/10 (Colom.)).
347 See Martin Pallares, Opinion, Ecuador’s Political Eruption, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/opinion/ecuadors-political-eruption.html?_r=0 [https://per
ma.cc/F5G7-LK59].
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leave power before he could return.348 This was a potentially signifi-
cant concession from the perspective of democracy: it allowed time for
an alternative presidential candidate to establish his or her credibility
as a long-term rival to Correa, for the ruling party to develop a
stronger identity separate from Correa, and for the Ecuadorian public
to see ongoing social and economic prosperity without Correa.349
The force of the opposition reflected public unease with the pos-
sibility of a president staying in power indefinitely. But the opposition
also had considerable success with its campaign arguing that a change
this fundamental should be tested in a public referendum.350 In effect,
the opposition lost in the courts (as they had believed they would) but
made headway with political arguments that the pathway of constitu-
tional change being pursued by Correa, and the ends he was seeking,
were illegitimate and self-serving. The change to the amendment
proved to be highly significant—even though a candidate from Cor-
rea’s movement, Lenin Moreno, won the 2017 election, Moreno broke
sharply from Correa on the term limits issue. Indeed, one of his first
major acts was to seek a referendum on whether to reimpose presi-
dential term limits, and that referendum passed overwhelmingly in
February 2018.351
Another prominent example of popular enforcement of tiered
constitutionalism occurred in Honduras in the case referred to previ-
ously, where President Manuel Zelaya in 2009 sought a pathway to-
wards constitutional replacement.352 While the courts used a series of
technical arguments linked to the lack of legal authority held by
Zelaya and the illegality of the process he proposed in light of existing
law, the opposition outside of the courts seized on constitutional arti-
cles limiting presidents to only one term in office, preventing those
articles from being amended, and providing penalties for political offi-
348 See Taylor Gillan, Ecuador Lawmakers End Presidential Term Limits, JURIST (Dec. 4,
2015, 8:43 AM), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2015/12/ecuador-lawmakers-end-presidential-
term-limits.php [https://perma.cc/YPT2-9D8Y].
349 See David Landau, Brian Sheppard & Rosalind Dixon, Opinion, How to Fix Latin
America’s ‘Strongman’ Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/
18/opinion/how-to-fix-latin-americas-strongman-problem.html [https://perma.cc/GM57-E7N8].
350 Indeed, it is worth noting that an aborted attempt by Correa supporters to allow the
amendment to come into effect immediately, allowing Correa to run as a candidate in 2017, was
structured as a proposal for a referendum. See Ysol Delgado, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa to Sup-
porters: Thanks But I Won’t Run for Reelection, PANAM POST, (Aug. 21, 2016, 1:24 PM), http://
panampost.com/ysol-delgado/2016/08/21/ecuador-president-correa-reelection-thanks-but-no/
[https://perma.cc/8ANV-EZWS].
351 See Ayala & Rochabrun, supra note 319.
352 See FELDMAN, LANDAU, SHEPPARD & SUAZO, supra note 294, at 10–15.
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cials seeking to change the prohibition.353 Thus, the popular reaction
against Zelaya centered on the eternity clause prohibiting presidential
reelection. The Zelaya episode ended with an extraordinarily destabi-
lizing step: a military coup that removed Zelaya and installed his vice
president as the new president.354 Many analysts believe that Zelaya
also posed a threat of democratic erosion within Honduras, and the
no-reelection clause served as a focal point for the opposition because
it was a potent symbol of the unconstitutionality of his actions.355
Finally, recent experience in Paraguay offers a promising exam-
ple of popular enforcement of a specially entrenched term limit. In
2017, allies of incumbent president Horacio Cartes sought to amend a
provision limiting presidents to one five-year term in order to allow
his reelection.356 This change was sought using the country’s default
amendment mechanism of absolute approval in both houses of Con-
gress, followed by a proposed referendum.357 However, the
Paraguayan Constitution expressly stated that changes to “the dura-
tion of . . . mandates” (among certain other subjects) could only be
made by the procedure used for a “reform” rather than a mere
amendment, which would require a constituent assembly.358 The Sen-
ate pressed ahead and passed the proposal despite this language.359
However, this led to massive popular protests, along with pressure
from the United States and the Catholic Church.360 In the face of this
popular pressure, the lower house rejected the measure.361
These three episodes of popular enforcement highlight the rela-
tionship between tiered amendment systems, constitutional language,
and popular identification. The debates between rigid and flexible
amendment rules are embedded in broader discussions about consti-
353 See id. at 28–31.
354 Id. at 15–19.
355 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FOUND., THE FACTS AND THE LAW: BEHIND THE DEMO-
CRATIC CRISIS OF HONDURAS, 2009, at 157–58 (2010); Frank M. Walsh, The Honduran Constitu-
tion Is Not a Suicide Pact: The Legality of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya’s Removal, 38 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 339, 357–60 (2010).
356 See Ignacio Gonza´lez Bozzolasco, Paraguay: La Reeleccio´n Presidencial y los Inicios de
la Carrera Electoral 2008, 37 REV. CIENCIA POL. 543, 559–60 (2017) (Chile).
357 See CONSTITUCIO´N DE LA REPU´BLICA DE PARAGUAY [PARAGUAY CONST.] 2009, art.
290, translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., Maria del Carmen
Gress trans., HeinOnline 2012).
358 See id. arts. 289–291.
359 See Laurence Blair, Paraguay’s Reelection Crisis is Over—for Now, WORLD POL. REV.
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tutional models; in recent work, the logic of a long, detailed, and flexi-
ble constitutional model is contrasted with that of a short, abstract,
and rigid one.362 In an empirical sense, many uses of tiered amend-
ment designs also take a tiered approach to constitutional language.
That is, detailed and specific language is generally left on the lower
tier and thus made relatively flexible, while the higher, more en-
trenched tier tends to contain more abstract language, including basic
principles like the “separation of powers” and the founding values of
the state.363 At least when federal and state constitutionalism are
viewed as part of the same package, the United States also shows
roughly such a design: the U.S. Constitution is not only extremely
rigid but also famously short and written in framework-like language,
while most state constitutions are not only easier to change but also
extensive and detailed.364
A tiered approach to language, like such an approach to amend-
ment, may have significant benefits. Specific and detailed language al-
lows actors to give detailed instructions to institutions on a number of
topics, thus easing coordination in modern politics and increasing the
buy-in of competing interest groups without delegating too much
power to courts or ordinary political processes.365 But more abstract
and framework-like language may also have key advantages. It may,
for example, increase comprehension, identification, and attachment
by ordinary citizens in their constitutions.366 Increased identification
may build a constitutional culture through time, helping to protect in a
general way against destabilizing and antidemocratic change. In a
more specific sense, as the three examples show, such language may
also serve as a focal point for popular resistance to elite attempts at
manipulating the constitution.
The precise way in which a tiered system of constitutional lan-
guage can be used to build popular identification with core aspects of
362 See Versteeg & Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched, supra note 3, at 657–58; ELKINS,
GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 3, at 82–88 (arguing for the virtues of flexibility and specificity
as better promoting constitutional longevity).
363 See supra Sections V.A, V.B (giving examples).
364 See Versteeg & Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism, supra note 3, at
1643–46; Stephanopoulos & Versteeg, supra note 158, at 138–39 (finding higher levels of popular
identification with the Federal Constitution than with state constitutions).
365 See ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 3, at 82; Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note
198, at 655–56.
366 In a survey of U.S. state constitutions, Stephanopoulos and Versteeg found little rela-
tionship between length and popular identification with the constitution, but they did find that
citizens who know more about their state constitutions identify more heavily with them. See
Stephanopoulos & Versteeg, supra note 158, at 145, 152–53.
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a constitution is a difficult and open question, largely beyond the
scope of this Article. In many cases, this might be achieved by protect-
ing founding values, basic principles, or a core set of rights that
strongly resonate with transnational practices, while also expressing a
distinctive set of local understandings. In others, it might be achieved
with more precise but simple, accessible, rule-like language that is
viewed by citizens as the heart of the constitution, as with the Hondu-
ran and Paraguayan no-reelection clauses.367
In each case, however, the core feature would be that the higher
tier would not only be formally more difficult to amend, but also gen-
eral and parsimonious enough to capture the public imagination,
whereas more ordinary provisions are more detailed and technical in
nature. Designed in this way, the tiering of constitutional provisions
may create mutually reinforcing forms of judicial and popular checks
on abusive constitutional change: if a higher constitutional tier is not
only formally more entrenched, but also expressed in relatively acces-
sible constitutional language, this may increase the chances of effec-
tive popular, as well as judicial, checks on antidemocratic
constitutional change.
CONCLUSION
This Article illuminates an important and ubiquitous but over-
looked form of constitutional design: a tiered procedure of constitu-
tional amendment. Article V in the United States creates a crude
version of this tiering;368 Article V in conjunction with the flexible sys-
tem of change found in many state constitutions creates a more com-
prehensive version. As demonstrated, a large number of constitutions
worldwide use a variety of tiered designs. This Article argues that such
a system shows great promise in combining the virtues of flexible and
rigid constitutionalism. It can allow actors to make needed updates to
the constitution, while also preserving the core of the constitution
against destabilizing and antidemocratic forms of change, and helping
to build a constitutional identity.
Studying tiered constitutional designs in light of these core pur-
poses suggests important insights that could be used to improve the
way in which constitutions are drafted and enforced. Designers should
consider the potential dangers of entrenching too many provisions
(for example, placing all rights on the higher tier), of adopting an
367 See HONDURAS CONST. art. 223; PARAGUAY CONST. art. 229.
368 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
 512 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:438
overly rule-based approach that could be evaded by would-be authori-
tarian actors, and of protecting higher tiers solely through devices like
enhanced supermajorities with effects highly contingent on details of
political context. Judges can improve the enforcement of tiered
clauses by using comparative law, testing domestic constitutional
change in light of a global understanding of those institutions that are
essential for electoral democracy.
This Article’s brief survey of the practice of tiered clauses in the
face of antidemocratic efforts should be sufficient to show that perfec-
tion in enforcement is an unrealistic goal in such a challenging area.
The question, however, is whether both the design and doctrine sur-
rounding tiered designs can constitute a sufficient obstacle to authori-
tarian projects that some of them are deterred and others are slowed
down enough to be derailed. The key issue, in other words, is not
whether these designs can succeed in ideal conditions with robust con-
stitutional culture and high levels of judicial independence—an-
tidemocratic or destabilizing projects of constitutional change are
unlikely to emerge under such conditions at any rate. It is instead
whether a tiered design can function under the more difficult condi-
tions where authoritarian threats typically occur with threatened and
delegitimized institutions and weaker courts. The record suggests
pause but also potential. At least where clauses can serve as the focal
point for popular support in addition to or instead of judicial enforce-
ment, they can serve a very valuable purpose.
Despite the challenges of constitutional design in this area, the
question of which design best defends the basic stability and demo-
cratic core of the constitutional order, without leading to ossification,
is a crucial one. Unfortunately, future events across a range of coun-
tries seem likely to provide more insight into whether the best ap-
proach is flexible constitutionalism, the tiered design explored here, or
instead a return to the rigid framework model embraced in the United
States but in few other countries around the world.
